Richard Rufus's De anima Commentary: The Earliest Known, Surviving, Western De anima Commentary

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Richard Rufus of Cornwall was educated as a philosopher at Paris where he was a master of arts. In 1238, after lecturing on Aristotle's libri naturales, Rufus became a Franciscan and moved to Oxford to study theology, becoming the Franciscan master of theology in about 1256 and probably dying not long after 1259.

Rufus's conversion to Franciscanism was marked by a desire to distance himself from Aristotle and other worldly philosophers. As a Franciscan, Rufus to some extent repudiated his own earlier views; occasionally he referred to them as the opinions of a "secular master." In his later career, Rufus used the technical terminology of philosophy sparingly — preferring not to use phrases like 'agent intellect' or 'intellectus agentis'. And even before Rufus became a Franciscan, he gave an increasingly sympathetic hearing to non-Aristotelian and Platonic views, as is plain from his Contra Averroem (CAv). As a Franciscan, Rufus twice lectured on Peter Lombard's Sentences, first at Oxford in about 1250 where he was the first bachelor of theology to lecture there on Lombard, and then at Paris.

Rufus's philosophical works are preserved at Erfurt, in two codices purchased by Amplonius de Berka in about 1400: Quarto 290 and Quarto

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3. Rufus, Contra Averroem 1.6: "Quid ergo verius videtur quam opinio Platonica ponens universalia ideas esse" (Erfurt Quarto 312.82va). Hereafter CAv Q.312.
As bound by Amplonius, Erfurt Quarto 312 begins with Rufus's *Physics* (fol. 1–14ra) and *De generatione et corruptione* (fol. 14ra–19ra) commentaries, followed on folios 29va–32vb by his commentary on the *Posterior analytics*. In between, on folios 19rb–28vb, there is a *De anima* commentary, which also turns out to be by Rufus. In Spring 2000, before I finished transcribing the commentary from Erfurt Quarto 312, I found that another version of it had already been published. Manuel Alonso, S.J., published most of books 2 and 3 as a work by Peter of Spain, later Pope John XXI. Since Erfurt Quarto 312, folios 19rb–28vb, includes book 1 as well as books 2 and 3, in one sense it is more complete. The Madrid manuscript is more complete in another sense though, as it includes literal exposition as well as questions and divisions of the text. Though lacking the literal exposition of books 2 and 3, Erfurt Quarto 312 (Q312) does include a literal exposition of book 1.

Alonso's attribution of the work to Peter of Spain was rejected on good grounds by R. Gauthier in his preface to the Leonine edition of St. Thomas's *De anima* commentary. Alonso ascribed the work to Peter of Spain chiefly because the manuscript in which it is found, Madrid B. National 3314, was organized by the same scribe responsible for the Madrid (BN 1877) manuscript of Peter's medical works. But as Gauthier points out, a number of the other works in Madrid BN 3314 are not by Peter of Spain, but by Grosseteste, Bacon, and Buckfield. And since the doctrine differs somewhat from Peter's, there's no particular reason to believe the work is by him.

5. Only three minor philosophical work are missing from the collection, Rufus's *De intellectu divino* (Assisi 138, 262va–263ra), his *De mutatione* (Toulouse 737, 258ra–va) and his *De rationibus seminalibus* (Toulouse 737, 258va–160vb), all of which are preserved only in Franciscan miscellanies.


The difference between the two versions of the *De anima* commentary parallels the differences between the redactions of Rufus's mature *Metaphysics* commentary (DMet). In both cases, the Erfurt redactions lack straight textual exposition and are comprised chiefly of short questions and notes on problems raised by the text. The Erfurt *De anima*, unlike Erfurt DMet, also includes an opening paragraph outlining the text, a series of divisions in which the first member but not the second member is further divided. Omitted in Erfurt DMet, these divisions also appear in Rufus's Erfurt *Physics* commentary, which like the Erfurt *De anima* includes these divisions as well as lemmata, questions and notes. As in the case of DMet, the two redactions are close enough to be collated. Deliberate changes have been made, however, most noticeably in introductory and transitional wording; a retro reference has been adjusted. How the two versions are related requires further study.

7. Oddly this literal version appears at the end of book I; it is not integrated with the notes and questions. It is written in a slightly different hand, but that probably does not indicate a change in author or a different work. Such changes are quite common in the works by Rufus preserved at Erfurt; DMet for example was copied by a number of slightly different hands.

Why do I think this commentary is by Rufus? For five reasons: manuscript location, genre, citation form, self-reference, and doctrine. Probably no single reason would be sufficient by itself, since Rufus shares both stylistic devices and views with his contemporaries, particularly those whom he influenced, such as Roger Bacon and Robert Kilwardby, and the author of the anonymous commentary on De anima edited by R. Gauthier. Taken together, however, doctrine, self-reference, and style paint a picture of the same author using the same tools.

First, in a class by itself, is the circa 1240 manuscript where the De anima commentary appears, Erfurt Quarto 312. This manuscript includes a
number of unattributed works from what I have called “The Ave Maria Aristotle Quires.” So far in every case where the author of these works has been identified, it has been Rufus. The De anima commentary (In DAn) is most closely related in the manuscript to three other works by Rufus: his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics (In Phys.), De generatione et corruptione (In DGæn), and Analytica posteriora (In APos). Rufus’s Physics commentary appears in what were at one time, quires 49–50; his commentary on De generatione et corruptione on quires 50–51; the new De anima commentary on quires 51–52, where it begins a new column, but not a new page. Rufus’s In APos begins on quire 52 and would probably have been completed on quire 53, which has been lost. The Erfurt scribes made some effort to begin new works on a new column; so the beginning of In De generatione et corruptione on line 11 of folio 14ra was probably a disappointment. Sometimes new books of the same work also start on a fresh column—viz., In DAn 2 and 3. In the original colophons, the word “Explicit” appears alone; there is no scribal indication of a change of author.

Second, there’s the form of the commentary, brief divisions of the text followed by questions varying in length from five lines to five pages. The wording and style of the divisions closely resembles those in Rufus’s other early commentaries. Rufus quite frequently sees Aristotle making a transition from what is principally intended to a consideration of its well being — bene esse — or vice versa. Questions appear singly and in unrelated groups. Questions on a given text about unrelated topics are grouped together, and the answers are not presented until after all the questions have been stated; another example of this unusual practice is Rufus’s Posterior analytics commentary.


13. De anima itself has no contemporary explicit. Space was left deliberately left blank on the column and in the signature. So the work is probably incomplete, though not much is missing; the last words pertain to Aristotle, DAn 3.12.434a22.

14. Rufus, In DAn 1: “Prior pars adhuc dividitur in duas, quorum prima est de esse principaliter intentionum, secunda de bene esse intentionis sua” (Q 312.19rb).

Rufus, In Anal. pos (In APos) 1: “Liber iste dividitur in duas partes in quorum prima determinat principale intentum; in secunda, quandam quaestionem consequentem, ibi: “De principiis,” et illa pars est de bene esse huius doctrinae quam consequens ad principale” (Q 312.29va). Italics here and hereafter indicate emphasis.

Rufus, Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot. (DMet) 1: “Iste autem liber primo dividitur in duas partes. In prima ponit quoddam capitulum quod est ad bene esse doctrinae et a bonitate doctoris, in secunda aggreditur quod intendit principaliter in hoc libro” (Vat. lat. 4538.2vb).

Third, reference to Aristotle resembles Rufus's other philosophical works. According to this early commentary convention, Aristotle is contrasted with ‘the Commentator’ (Averroes) as the ‘author’ or as ‘Aristotle’ and not as ‘the Philosopher’. Other authors of the period, including Roger Bacon, also follow this practice. It is not, however, general practice. Much earlier, Philip the Chancellor began to refer to Aristotle as ‘the Philosopher’. Rufus does this in 1250, but not before 1238.

Fourth, there is at least one reference from Rufus’s Oxford theology lectures to this De anima commentary. It is a characteristic but potentially misleading reference to his earlier views. Such citations are familiar in the case of his second Metaphysics commentary (Dissertatio in Metaph. [DM et]). Like his commentary on De anima, this commentary survives in two redactions, and the version found at Erfurt is comprised mostly of notes and questions. As a Franciscan, Rufus sometimes cites his philosophical works by telling us (disapprovingly) what “the philosophers” think. Such citations in his Oxford Sentences Commentary (SOx) made the authenticity of DM et controversial for many years. First, to see these references, Gedeon Gál concluded that DM et could not be by Rufus. Timothy Noone, however, was able to prove that the work was by Rufus.

We have since come to recognize critical self-reference as characteristic of Rufus, as for example in his discussions of the eternity of the world where SOx criticizes DM et, which in turn criticizes the Physics commentary. Distancing himself from his earlier secular works is a special case — the phrase “philosophi saeculares” apparently refers only to Rufus. By contrast, in SOx, reference to “philosophi” may refer to Averroes, but it is just as likely to refer to Rufus himself. So it is exciting to have a reference to the “philosophi,” which cannot refer to Averroes and does refer to the opinion Rufus states in his De anima commentary.

16. For the pairing of auctor and commentator, see also Anon., In DAn, ed. R. Gauthier, p. 98.
17. Rufus, In DAn. 1, Q 312.19va; In DAn. 2.1, Q 312.22va; In DAn. 3.3.3, Q 312.27va; In DAn. 3.8.2, Q 312.28rb; In APos 1, Q 312.30rb; In DGen. 1.1.6, Q 312.14rb; In Phys. 1.5.3, Q 312.2va.
18. N. Wicki found sixty instances of the use, see Philippus C., Summa de bono, (Berne: Editiones Franke, 1985), p. 45*.
In his Oxford theology lectures, Rufus compares the view of the philosophers with those of the theologians on the question whether the intellective, sensitive, and vegetative souls differ substantially. The philosophers answer in the affirmative; the theologians in the negative. Rufus himself then offers a third compromise view.

In his De anima commentary, Rufus maintains what he later describes as the philosophers’ view: the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective souls are essentially and substantially different prior to their union, yet they evolve into a single substance. The vegetative and sensitive soul comprise a potential entity that is perfected by the intellective soul.

The view we meet here was hotly controverted. As Rufus indicates in SOx, contemporary theologians rejected it. That is true of Ioannes de Rupella and Albertus Magnus, for example. The “philosophers” who agree that initially the three souls are not substantially the same explain this in different ways. Most commonly quoted and probably the first to try to reconcile Aristotle with Augustine on this point was the theologian, Philip the Chancellor. Philip held that the three substantial souls formed a single soul but were not completely unified. Constituting a quasi unum with the form of the intellective soul, human vegetative and sensitive souls are quasi material rather than completing forms. Philip’s analogy is of one light with two sources.

By contrast, in his De anima commentary Rufus sees the sensitive soul as completing the vegetative soul. In one sense they are substantially different souls, but when united the perfecting form and its subordinated incomplete forms comprise a single substance or essence. Rufus specifically claims that the human vegetative soul is in potential to the sensitive soul, which in turn is in potential to the intellective soul. Rufus speaks of the yielding or evolution of vegetative and sensitive souls into intellective souls, using the same language he uses in his Physics commentary to describe the evolution of specific forms from generic forms.
SOx cites just this view, making the comparison of the different souls to the differentia of a genus. But then Rufus worries that in such cases, unlike the specially created intellective soul, all differentia have an internal origin. After stigmatizing it as the philosopher's opinion, Rufus then somewhat oversimplifies the position as the claim that there are three substances in the soul, without adding they evolve into a single substance. But then he supports the claim by describing their evolution into a single substance: the vegetative soul is in potential to the sensitive soul, which is in potential to the intellective soul. After citing his own favorite Aristotelian authority, DA 2.1.412b5, Rufus cites the Pseudo Aristotelian De plantis in the next paragraph. The following two paragraphs are a very close paraphrase of the views of Philip the Chancellor, including his reference to the quasi materia, followed by a paragraph devoted to Philip's chosen example, a double-sourced light ray. So in this instance what is introduced as the "philosopher's opinion" turns out to be a statement not of one view but two: Rufus's own introduced with the words "the philosophers say," immediately followed by that of a prominent older, authority, the theologian, Philip the Chancellor. Rufus's own view probably had its proponents, but it was not common. Roger Bacon takes Philip's position in a different direction and makes explicit the claim that the soul is a form-matter composite, not troubling with Philip's "quasi materialis" qualification. For Rufus, by contrast, it would be misleading to describe the human soul, as a form-matter composite, since it is a form. It is not simple in the sense that it is a form without matter, but then, for Rufus, no form lacks matter except God. For Rufus, what is united here is a form in active potential with its completing form; it would be wrong to call it a form-matter composite except in a carefully qualified sense. So for their contemporaries from about 1240 to 1260, Rufus and Bacon were the alternatives: the union of completing forms with forms in active potential or form-matter composition.

At least one author pretty clearly aligns himself with Bacon. Peter of Spain holds that there is unity in the soul, but it is not substantial; his analogy is with combined lights from different sources.

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se tamen diversa. Hoc non est mirum, supposita hac propositione, quod essentia incompleta—quod est genus—cedit in diversas essentias, sicut punctus cedit in diversa puncta" (Q 312.11vb).
28. Rufus, Sententia Oxoniensis 2.17: "Quod si ita esset, respondetur de facili in hac quaestione, sicut universaliter de genere et differentia, scilicet quod sunt una natura in actu et duae in potentia. Sed adhuc obstaret unum, numquam inventur quod genus veniat ab intrinseco, et differentia ab extrinseco, nec e contrario. Sed semper per unus viam procedunt ad esse. Ergo nisi et sensivita veniat ab extrinseo sicut et rationalis, non erit una genus ad alteram" (B62.145rb).
29. See section I.3, below, num. 7.
30. Bacon, Quesitio in librum de causis, ed. F. Delorme and R. Steele, OHI 12:158.
More often, authors try to have it both ways. Adam Buckfield, for example, explains the unity of the soul both in terms of matter and form and in terms of prior and posterior forms. He states the analogy of a light with two sources, but then says that perhaps a better analogy is of a light with both splendor and heat, a traditional simile for the more perfect unity of the Trinity. Anonymous Gauthier, too, speaks both about form-matter composition and about the unity achieved by successively realizing potentials. Again there are two analogies, one for each model.

Anonymous Vennebusch provides the most elaborate compromise, positing both a real union, which is a quasi composite, and a true matter-form composite, which is unified only with respect to the body. He holds that the union of the vegetative and the sensitive souls forms one single essence. Since like genus and differentia it unites an incomplete form with a complementary form, it is a composite only in a qualified sense. By contrast, the union of the intellectual soul with the sensitive soul does not produce a single essence. It is a composite in the same sense that matter and form are a composite. It does not form a single essence, since the intellectual soul comes from outside and is not educed by an external agent from the potential of the sensitive soul.

Strictly speaking, then, what SOx directly calls the ‘philosophers’ position can be verified only in Rufus’s De anima commentary, as far as we know. It is not a position held by other authors known to us, though variations on it are common. Since opinions attributed to “the philosophers” in SOx have so far been verified only in the works of Averroes and in Rufus, and this is not Averroes’ view, this citation is good evidence for attributing the work to Rufus.

Fifth, there are many points of doctrine on which the author of the De anima commentary agrees with Rufus. Some are shared with other early Aristotle commentators, but others are held in the early thirteenth century by no author other than Rufus as far as we know. These include Rufus’s use of formal predication and his allowance for violent local motion which continues in the absence of contact with the original mover. Occasionally, there is verbal resemblance, but more often only the views are shared. Since there are so many parallel passages, it seemed best to divide them by subject: metaphysics, psychology, and so on. Most of the remainder of this paper will examine twenty-five tenets stated both in Rufus’s De anima commentary and in his other works. Next, disagreements will be considered and a conclusion stated. The paper will close with some reflections on dating. The outline is as follows:

1. Doctrinal agreements

1.1 Distinctions employed
   1. Reason and sign
   2. Mathematical abstraction
   3. Abstraction from the conditions of hereness and nowness
   4. Essential and accidental potential
   5. First and second act
   6. Formal predication

1.2 Metaphysics
   7. The soul as a subject of metaphysics
   8. The nature of light
   9. The first cause as the universal form

1.3 Natural philosophy
   10. World soul
   11. Dimension
   12. Active potential and substantial change
   13. Dividing the continuum
   14. Resilience and projectile motion

1.4 Psychology
   15. Sensation distinguished from intellection
   16. Magnitude as an object of the passive intellect
   17. Sensory operation
   18. Vision and extramission
   19. All sensibles reduced to light
   20. Vision as the paradigmatic sense
   21. Agent intellect acts like an external light
   22. Nonnatural sensibles and intelligibles
   23. The agent intellect has all intelligibles
   24. The agent intellect is part of the human soul
   25. Humans do not have the understanding of the agent intellect

2. Disagreements on doctrine
3. Conclusion regarding the attribution
4. Dating

1. DOCTRINAL AGREEMENTS

1.1 Distinctions Employed

1. Reason and Sign
Instead of distinguishing between what can be established by reason or argument (ratio) and what is evident from experience, Rufus prefers to distinguish between arguments from reason and arguments based on signs.
This use of the term ‘sign’ can be understood by reference to Michael Scot who defines ‘sign’ used in this sense as a sensible means of proof. Examples of this usage are frequent in In DA and also found in Rufus’s other works. In Physics 2, for example, Rufus asks why Aristotle chooses to prove that matter is nature not with an argument but a ‘sign’:

In Phys. 2.2.2: Quaeritur quare solum verificat materiam esse naturam per signum et non per rationem [2.1.193a12]. (Q 312.3rb)

Similarly, when adducing counter-examples against Aristotle on projectile motion, Rufus describes not experience but “signs,” one of which is the case of two projectiles which can travel in opposite directions in the same medium without impeding each other:

In Phys. 8.3.1: Sed adhuc per plura signa videtur quod non sufficiat ponere totam causam in medio. Si enim motus mediis sic faceret motum proiecti, tunc duo proiecta obviantia sibi impeditent sibi. (Q 312.13va)

Other authors from the same period, particularly those influenced by Rufus, use the term ‘signum’ in the same way.

2. Mathematical Abstraction

Rufus believes that all knowledge requires abstraction, but he distinguishes the abstraction common to naturalists and logicians, indeed to all knowers—namely, the abstraction of universals—from mathematical abstraction, which prescinds from every material or transitory disposition. He makes this distinction in much the same words both in In DA and in In Phys.


37. In DA 3.3: “Conseuente subiungit rationem... Hic subiungit secundum rationem ad idem... Conseuente manifestat dictam diffinitionem per viam signi... Conseuente subiungit signum, et dividit hic pars in duas secundum duo signa que ponit... Conseuente subiungit signum ad secundam partem... cum sensus senserit aliquid valde excellens sive intensum...” (MA.308-9); 3.3 “per signum” (MA.324).

materiae cuiusmodi sunt mobilitas, materiae et mobilitatis.
contrarietas et huismodi, et haec abstrahit mathematicus;
et non naturalibus secundum quod alio vero modo naturalis. (Q312.3va)

naturalia sunt. (MA.320, Q312.27rb)

Another author making the same point states it much more simply and in different terms:

3. ABSTRACTION FROM THE CONDITIONS OF HERENESS AND NOWINESS
Moreover, Rufus describes common abstraction as the removal of the conditions of hereness and nowness, a description not found in other authors of the same period.

In DAn 3.2.3: in similitudine formae singularis est similitudo formae universalis sive intentio cum conditionibus appropriantibus et facientibus illud, ut hic et nunc. Intellectus autem agens abstrahit hanc speciem sive similitudinem ab his conditionibus appropriantibus per eius praesentiam super imaginabile. (MA.331, Q312.28ra)

4. ESSENTIAL AND ACCIDENTAL POTENTIAL
Taken from Averoes, the distinction between essential and accidental potential is commonly used, but its wording in In DAn is strikingly similar to a passage from In Phys.:

Rufus, In DAn 2.5: . . .
potentia quaedam est essentialis sive remota. . .
exists in potentia primo modo dicta est in potentia prima indigens agente transmutante et disponente ipsum ad hoc ut exeat in actum; existens autem in potentia secundo modo dicta . . .
se ipso potest exire in actum, . . . et solum indiget solvente prohibens. (MA. 166)

Rufus, In Phys. P2: Et est potentia accidentalis illa quae non indiget nisi tantom removente prohibens ad hoc quod exeat in actum, ut lapsis retentus sursum est in potentia deorsum.

Potentia vero essentialis est quae indiget agente et transmutante et disponente ad hoc quod exeat in actum.

(MA.166)

Few medieval authors employ this distinction as frequently and as prominently as Rufus, who sometimes states it quite crisply: essential potential can only be actualized by an (external) agent, while the realization of an accidental potential requires only the removal of an obstacle. As a theologian, Rufus continues somewhat apologetically to use the same distinction, referring to it as a teaching of worldly letters.

5. FIRST AND SECOND ACT
Closely related to the distinction between essential and accidental potential is Rufus’s use of the distinction between first and second act. This distinction is used to explain an unusual sense of the term ‘act’, the sense in which the soul is in act and unrealized knowledge is actual. Sleepers have the first act, also called the habit, of science without actually being able to reflect on or consider things.

Reference to the first act of the soul stems ultimately from Aristotle [DAn 2.1.412a27-28] and in the thirteenth century from Alfred of Sareshel, who tells us that the first act of the soul is life, which is prior to all motion; indeed, it starts the movement of the heart. For Alfred, the closer a motion is to this first act the more perfect it is. Alfred’s distinction comes from a passage in Aristotle, where he asserts that life itself is the power of perception or thinking (ENic 9.9.1170a15–19), which is as-
similated to the claim that life itself is an act. Neither Aristotle nor Alfred refer to a second act.

By the time of Philip the Chancellor, both a first and a second act are mentioned, but the distinction is not between having and exercising a power. Rather, the first act is the perfection of the thing itself and the second is an act initiated by the thing but extending beyond it. Averroes presents precisely the same distinction as Rufus. However, he describes not first and second acts, but primary (first) and posterior perfections. Avicenna describes a variety of related distinctions, but again does not refer to first and second acts.

Rufus explicates Aristotle's distinction between scientia and consideratio (2.1.412a21–28) by reference to a passage from the Physics 8.4.255a30-255b31, where Aristotle distinguishes proximate and remote potential and offers the same example. In his De anima commentary, Rufus explicitly makes the link between proximate and remote potential and first and second act to explain the sense in which the soul is an act. Elsewhere in his writings, he repeatedly describes the distinction between scientia and consideratio in terms of first and second acts.

44. Summa Halesiana, Quaracchi 1924–1948 (ut Summa Fratris Alexandri) 4.478, 2.1: 653.
46. Averroes, In DAn 2.6, ed. F. Crawford, CCA 6.1: 137. Philoponus posits a similar distinction between first and second act. See In Arist. De gen. et corr. Commentaria, ed. H. Vitelli: (Berlin 1897) p. 188. But that work was not available in Latin until after 1527 (Vitelli, p. x).
47. Rufus, In DAn 2.1: “... creatur hoc de potentia remota ... non de potentia propinqua ... dicens quod anima est actus ipsius corporis aut sicut primus actus scilicet, et hoc ad minus, aut sicut actus secundus, ut actu videre est ipsius organi visui (MA. 122).
Rufus, In DAn 3.3.4: “Dicendum <praem. Et MA> quod anima est actus non ut considerare sed ut scientia, id <id est scilicet MA> est, eo quod habitualiter exerceret <exercet MA> suas operationes, non semper actualiter” (MA. 329, Q312.27vb).
48. Cf. Rufus, In Phys.: 3.1.8: “Actus est duplex: primus et secundus—primus, ut substantia est actus formae, secundum quod dicimus quod scientia in habitu est actus scientis; secundus autem est ipsa forma cum operatione sua cuiusmodi est considerare” (Q312.5rb).
Cf. etiam Rufus, CAv 1: “Sed tertio modo dicta forma, scilicet habitus et actus primus non secundus, qui est ut considerare.” (Q312.83rb).
Rufus, SOx pr: “Dupliciter dicitur cognitio, scilicet habitus et actus, actus primus et secundus” (B62.12rb).
The various distinctions we have been discussing are not identical in meaning. Alfred's first act is prior temporally and in nobility. For Philip, the distinction between first and second act is between the perfection of a thing and its external act. Bonaventure accepts Philip's version of the distinction. The Summa Halesiana posits three kinds of act, something Rufus never does.

Other authors use the same terminology to make the same distinction, but (as far as we know) never before 1238. For example, Albert uses it to explain how someone sleeping can be described as actually knowing without exercising that knowledge. These authors, however, knew and used Rufus's works. Rufus's usage of the distinction was not common when he first employed it.

6. Formal Predication
Unknown in other early thirteenth-century authors, except when they are citing Rufus, is the distinction between what is subjectively or substantially the same and what is the same by formal predication. The search for the early scholastic predecessor to whom Scotus refers under the rubric “antiqui doctores” when stating the formal distinction had gone on unsuccessfully for many decades when Franz Pelster and Gedeon Gál identified Rufus as the ancient doctor in question. Rufus's development of this distinction is a key to the comparative dating of his works, so instances of its use will be quoted below in section 2.

53. Anon., In DAn 2.13 q.2: “Et uidetur quod non, quoniam, sicut dicit in littera, color est per se visibilis, non ita quod sit ibi praedicatio formalis, set causalis, quoniam habet in se causam quare uideatur; non requiritur ergo lumen extra per defectum coloris” (ed. R. Gauthier, p. 310). Gauthier refers to MA. 179.
54. Scotus, Ordinatio 1.8 pars 1.4.194: “Et istud argument de non formali identitate dixerunt antiqui doctores ponentes in divisum aliquam esse praedicationem veram per identitatem quae tamen non esset formalis: ita concedo ego, per identitatem bonitatem esse veritatem in re, non tamen veritatem esse formali bonitatem” (Opera Omnia 4.262).
1.2 Metaphysics

7. The Soul as a Subject of Metaphysics
In what sense does the metaphysician consider the soul, and how does the metaphysics of the soul differ from its psychology? Both when lecturing on the Metaphysics and when lecturing on De anima, Rufus answers with a distinction based loosely on Avicenna: the study of the soul per se must be distinguished from the study of the soul as the principal of animation. Rufus tells us that metaphysics treats the soul as a spirit or intelligencia—that is, as a substance abstracted from or unconnected with a body. By contrast, the psychologist considers the soul as the "act of a natural body," a variation on Aristotle’s definition of the soul (2.1.412a19–22, 2.1.412b5–6, 2.4.415b7). At least one author subsequent to Rufus, the author of the Philosophica disciplina which seem to have been influenced by Rufus’s introduction to his Physics commentary makes the same distinction. At about 1245, he concludes that the metaphysician studies the soul in itself, absolutely, as a separate, spiritual substance or intelligence.

8. The Nature of Light
Common to every composite being—that is, everything apart from God—elemental or celestial, is the nature of light, incorporeal light. That claim is made both in the De anima lectures and the early Memoriale in Metaph. (M M et).

In DAn 2.15.4: Omne corpus compositum habet in se naturam caelestem, ut lucem incorporatam qua mediate conservatur et per quam est forma eius particularis in sua materia ipsam perficiens. (Q312.26va)

M M et 10.4: . . . sphaerae non continuantur neque supracaelestes neque elementares. Dicitur tamen unum ex his aut propter unum finem, sicut dictum est, aut propter unam naturam communicatam in his ut natura lucis. (Q290.51vb)

56. Rufus, In DAn 2: “Haec enim differentia incorporeum est ipsius animae secundum quod anima est in se absoluta substantia, scilicet secundum quod anima est de consideratione metaphysici. Sic autem non intendit hic de anima sed secundum quod est natura sive actus corporis naturalis” (Q312.22va).

Rufus’s Physics and De anima commentaries identify this light with Aristotelian quintessence. But the claim itself is carefully qualified. The being and capacity to act of every composite is preserved by a nature in which they participate, but that nature is not a part of them, nor does it pertain to their essence.

Phys. 4.1.8: Propterea dicendum quod haec natura est forma, sed non est forma quae sit pars rei sicut dictum est prius . . . est enim in omnibus his inferioribus elementis sive elementatis, praeter materiam et formam quae est pars rei . . . [forma] quae non est pars rei, quae est natura corporis quinti, per quam custoditur et salvatur forma quae est pars rei in materia. (Q312. 7va)

Particular forms act in virtue of the superior form or quintessence in which they participate, but that quintessence is not part of their essence.

In DAn 1.6: Dicendum quod cum elementa habeant formas particulares . . . terminatae sunt et ligatae materiae, non possunt de se facere se extra se, et ita nec aliud agere, sed per participationem formae superioris ut naturae corporis quinti possunt agere. Hae autem forma communis eis non est de eorum essentia ut ipsam ingrediens. (Q312.20ra)

Beings cannot be reduced to a single nature, but they act in virtue of a shared nature.

In DAn 2.15.4: Dicendum quod sensibilia non sunt aliquid unum sive unius naturae; quantitas enim et qualitas, ut magnitudo et color, non reducuntur ad aliquid unum quod sit de eis . . . Sic igitur intelligendum quod omnia sensibilia communicant in natura lucis, scilicet non tanquam in aliqo quod sit de eorum essentia, sed tanquam in aliqo per quod omnia sensibilia immutant ipsos sensus. (Q312.26va)

9. The First Cause as the Universal Form
Qualified in the same way is the closely related claim that God, or the first cause, is the form of everything. Rufus describes God as the ‘forma omnium’ or ‘causa formalis omnium.’ God is the divine exemplar, idea, or species of all things, as we learn from Rufus’s De intellectu divino, his Physics commentary, and his De anima lectures.58 Already somewhat old-fashioned in the 1230s, this claim is as characteristic of Grosseteste as of Rufus,59 who modifies it in

58. Rufus, In Phys. 1.1.3: “Intelligendum quod prima causa est forma omnium sive exemplar sicut sigillum est forma cerae” (Q312.1vb).
Rufus, De intellectu divino: “IDEO DICENDUM QUOD HOC EST QUIA IPSAE EST FORMA ET SPECIES ET SIMILITUDO, UNDE EST CAUSA EFFICIENS” ET FINIS ET FORMA OMNIIUM” (Assisi 138.26vb).

the De anima, as he explains that Aristotle’s understanding of participation in the divine differs from the Neoplatonic participation in the divine ideas, expressed by the phrase “forma omnium.” Aristotle explicitly denies that things communicate with the divine; they can only imitate divine immortality by reproducing and hence preserving the species. Rufus correctly informed his students that for Aristotle the only aspect of the divine imitated by creatures is incorruptibility. Despite what Aristotle says, however, it is true that God or the first being is the formal cause of all things, as their exemplar. To deny this would be unchristian, as Rufus’s teacher, Alexander of Hales, claims on Augustine’s authority. Rufus both supports and qualifies exemplarism in In DAn: God is the form of all things in the sense of being the exemplar in accordance with which they are shaped and preserved. God is not the form of everything in the sense of being a part of them. Normally unqualified, such views were common in the generation of Grosseteste and Hales; much less so in Rufus’s time.

1.3 Natural Philosophy

10. WORLD SOUL

10. Surprisingly, and very uncommonly for an Aristotle commentator, Rufus posits a world soul, which moves the spheres and without which there would be no time.

In Phys. 4.3.17: non existente anima mundi, non erit tempus. (Q312.19a)

In DAn 1.3: . . . Anima autem mundi est principium motus . . . Et ille iterum circulus, scilicet anima secundum quod est principium motus zodiaci, dividitur in septem circulos. (Q312.19v)

Grosseteste, too, sometimes spoke of the world soul as the cause of the revolution of the heavens. But in later life he was more circumspect. Commenting on the same passage as Rufus, he refers to those who suppose

60. Rufus, DAn 2: “Et intelligendum per hoc quod dicit omnia participare esse divinum, non oportet ponere ipsum primum communicari ab omnibus tanquam formam eorum, sed intelligit per esse divinum esse incorruptibile tantum. Verumtamen verum est quod ipsum Primum est causa formalis omnium, non quae sit pars rei simpliciter separata a forma rei . . . Similiter ipsum Primum sive exemplaria, in primo sunt formae quasi exemplum iuxta quod conservatur res in esse, cum tamen non sit de essentia rei” (MA.149, Q312.22vb).

61. Alexander de Hales, Glossa in Sent. 1.36.4, ed. Quaracchi 1951, Bibliotheca Francescana Scholastica (BFS), 12:357.

that time comes from the celestial soul. According to J. McEvoy, Grosseteste eventually retracted the opinion. The rareness of the view among Aristotle commentators, makes this important evidence for Rufus's authorship of the De anima commentary, but it was not an opinion which played an important role in Rufus's thought.

11. Dimension
More significant for understanding Rufus's views is an extended concept of dimension. In addition to mathematical dimensions, there are natural dimensions. In the Physics commentary 'dimensio' refers to extensions of action, change, motion, and time.

In Phys. 2.4.3: Si ad fieri rei comparetur causa, dupliciter: cum sit fieri dimensio et fluxus ab uno in aliud. (Q 312.3vb)

In Phys. 2.6.1: Actio est sicut via et dimensio quaedam a quo et in quid. Cum autem est actio in fieri, terminatur quantum ad partem eius a quo; non terminatur autem sed est in fieri ex parte eius ad quod. (Q 312.4rb)

In Phys. 4.3.19: ... tempus et motus et omnia successiva dimensionantur solum secundum longitudinem sive secundum prius et posterius. (Q 312.9ra)

Even the connection between a subject and a predicate can be referred to as a dimension, as Rufus's Posterior analytics commentary shows.

In APoS 1: Est enim propositione quaedam dimensio inter subiectum et praedicatum, ut alias patet. (Q 312.30va)

In In DAn, we find science described as the dimension or connection between an axiom and a conclusion.

63. Grosseteste, In Phys. 4, loquitur de aliquibus qui “putaverunt ... esse tempus in anima celis” (ed. R. Dales, p. 95).
65. Rufus, In DGen 2.5.7, Q 312.18va. Rufus played a role in formulating the Western distinction between complete forms and incomplete forms or rather motion toward these forms as a distinction between forma and forma ad viam. It is a distinction that comes from Avicenna (Sufficientia 2.1, Venice 1508, fol. 23rb) and Averroes (In Phys. 3.4, Luntina 1550, fol. 41rb). But as C. Trifogli shows, Rufus's immediate successors followed his statement of the distinction. Judging from Trifogli's quotations, however, the Oxford tradition influenced by Rufus did not follow him in explicating the term ‘via’ as a dimension or flux (dimensio, fluxus). See C. Trifogli, Oxford Physics in the Thirteenth Century, (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 73–75.
12. Active Potential and Substantial Change

Also important and characteristic is Rufus's description of substantial change, according to which incomplete forms have the potential to yield to more complete forms, so that taken together they comprise a unified substance, which is actually one.

Rufus also describes an incomplete form as an active potential.

Normally, change does not occur without an external agent, which elicits the forces that drive the internal change and constitute its ultimate differentiae.

That is, an active potential can only be realized when the agent and what is acted on differ. Recognizing the difficulty, in In DAn Rufus describes an exception in which the active potential does not require this, and an agent can act on its own matter.
illa materia in illo loco <pos. manere MA> manere. Si autem sensitivum esset in potentia activa, esset hoc secundo modo; solum enim ageret ut salvaret speciem suam et non ut ipsam in alio generaret. Et propter ea non indigeret extrinseco sed per se ipsum exiret in actum. (MA.I64, Q312.23rb)

13. DIVIDING THE CONTINUUM

Another key to Rufus's natural philosophy is his description of dividing the continuum. Surprisingly, this account is closely related to his discussion of substantial change, since Rufus describes the generation of a specific substantial form from a generic form by analogy with the division of a continuum in his Physics commentary.

In Phys. 7.2.4: Hoc non est mirum, supposita hac propositione, quod essentia incompleta—quod est genus—cedit in diversas essentias, sicut punctus cedit in diversa puncta. Et quod genus cedat in diversas essentias, hoc oportet dicere si dicamus quod fiat species per receptionem non alterius essentiae. (Q312.11va)

In the De anima commentary, Rufus appeals to his account of the division of the continuum at a point to explain the sense in which an indivisible soul can be divided and extended.

In DAn 1.5.2: Dicendum quod anima sensibilis vel vegetabilis per accidentem dividitur. Hoc vocabulum ‘dividi’ dupliciter potest sumi—scilicet, aut proprie ut dicatur dividi aliquid cum ex illo fiat duo vel plura, ut linea dividitur in duas medietates—aut potest sumi communiter—scilicet, ut dicatur id dividi quod fit duo vel plura et non ex quo fiunt duo. Et hoc modo secundo est anima per accidentem divisibilis. Et intelligatur optimum simile in puncto quod proprie est simpliciter indivisible. (Q312.20rb–va)

Rufus uses this analogy to support his claim that these souls can be in different parts of the body without being divided. Dividing a line at A does not divide A. Rather when a line is divided one point becomes two. Strictly speaking it is mistaken to say that two points are made from A; instead one point (A itself) becomes two.

In DAn 1.5.2: proponatur linea cuius medius punctus sit A. Dividatur linea super punctum A. Igitur ante divisionem fuit unum punctum numero. Post divisionem autem est duo puncta numero. Est enim A terminus unius meditatis lineae et etiam terminus alterius meditatis. Et est in utraque meditata totum A. Nec fiunt duo puncta ex ipso A, quia ipsum fuit simpliciter indivisible. Et quia ante divisionem fuit A terminus utrisque meditatis non secundum quod separata sunt sed secundum quod uniuntur in totalem lineam, fuit A unus punctus numero.
ante divisionem. Facta autem divisione, quia A est terminus utriusque medietatis non secundum quod unita sunt sed distincta ab invicem, est A duo puncta numero. (Q.312.20rb-va)

Phys. 6.1.5: Videtur quod punctus sit divisibile, et nunc. Sumatur aliqua linea, et sumatur in ea A punctus qui est continuans duas partes lineae. Dividatur linea super A punctum. Sequitur, ut videtur, quod A dividatur in duo puncta, quia utraque medietas eundem terminum modo habet post divisionem quem prius habuit ante divisionem, et sunt actualiter duo termini post divisionem. Ex A ergo, qui fuit unus, fiunt duo. Dicendum quod per se loquendo non est proprie dicendum ex A fieri duo, sed ipsum A fieri duo. Totum enim A et remanet terminus unius et terminus alterius, et propterea non est dicere A dividi. (Q.312.9vb)

14. Resilience and Projectile Motion
Probably of less general relevance is Rufus’s account of a special case of local motion. Rufus reworks Aristotle’s analogy between local motion and alteration in the De anima commentary in order to accommodate the explanation of projectile motion he provides in the Physics commentary. According to Rufus, in local motion, or motus depulsionis, motion sometimes continues after the initial mover, which initially impelled the medium to move, has stopped moving. By contrast, in alteration, motion stops at once if the mover stops moving. Rufus ascribes the continued motion of the medium to resilience. Resilience is not motion per se but per accidens; it occurs when a substance is violently rarefied or condensed beyond the degree dictated by its form. So pressured condensed air, for example, springs back out. But since the initial impulse was violent, the counter-movement goes too far, leaving parts which were pushed too close together now too distant from each other. Again there is a rebound; this time the air springs back, moving inward. The result of repeated rebounds is a tremor or vibration. Importantly, such tremors do not interfere with each other. That means that a single resilient medium can assist and accomodate the movement of projectiles moving in opposite directions.

Thus the same account of the movement of the medium in projectile motion is provided both in Rufus’s De anima and in his Physics commentary. It is an account of unusual cases of local motion which continue in the absence of contact with an external mover—motion without substantial contact. Bacon explicitly rejects the claim that virtual contact can substitute for substantial contact. And contrary to Rufus, Bacon allows the continuance of a force (virtus) without substantial contact in alteration but not local

68. Rufus, In DAn 2.8, MA. 197–98.
69. Rufus, In DAn 2.8 and 3.11, MA.197–98, 393. Rufus, In Phys. 8.3.1, Q312.13va-vb.
So characteristic is this account that Anneliese Maier was not able to discover any other author who espoused the account of projectile motion opposed by Bacon before 1300.

1.4 Psychology

Alteration also plays an important role in Rufus’s psychology. Rufus believes that sensation is alteration without corruption. This distinguishes it, on the one hand, from intellecation and on the other hand from other kinds of qualitative change. Something can be subject to the action of another in three ways. Strictly speaking, being subject or suffering (pati) involves corruption, as is the case when something cold becomes hot; to undergo in this sense is to receive and thereby to be corrupted. Less properly, a subject can undergo change without corruption, so that by receiving it is changed and completed. In the commonest, least general sense of the term, a subject can receive and be completed without being changed.

15. Sensation Distinguished from Intellection

It is the second sense of being subject which defines sensation: it is alteration or reception with change but without corruption. An organ is completed rather than corrupted when sensation occurs.

In Phys 7.1.16: et praeterea adveniente specie alicuius sensibilis alerat ipsum organum, quoad illam completionem . . . et alterato organo aleratur ipsa anima quae radicatur in ipso organo. (Q312.11ra)

In DAn 3.2: Dicendum <praem. Et MA> ad primum quod omnis sensus immutatur . . . Non est ergo solum in potestia receptiva sed est 2eb aliqua natura quae aliquo modo communicat cum suis sensibilibus per quorum sensibilium unionem cum ipsa natura recipit, et immutatur sensus. Sed illa

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natura non similiter sed <sed aliter pos. habet MA> aliter se habet ante huiusmodi receptionem sive unionem et post. Ergo ista receptio cum alteratione quadam est. Ergo cum ipsa virtus sensitiva mediante huiusmodi proportione educatur per alterationem huius naturae sive proportionis, per consequens alterationem quandam recipiet. Est ergo in sensu pati per receptionem cum alteratione quadradam. (MA. 311, Q312.27ra)

In intellecction, by contrast, not only is there no corruption, but no change. The possible intellect is completed but not altered by receiving intelligible species.

In Phys 7.1.16: Sed intellectus non sic est; intellectus enim noster possibilis non intelligit omnia per hoc quod unam habet proportionem quae est mediatae omnium intelligibilium, sed solam quia est quasi ens in potentia receptiva, potens ea recipere et impleri per ipsam, et sicut completer non est alterari, sic nunc intelligere est alterari. Dicendum ergo quod intelligit similitudinem inter sentire et intelligere non penes hoc quod sentire est alterari aliquo modo, sed penes hoc quod praeter alterari est compleure (Q312.11ra)

In DAn 3.2: Sed intellectus recipit non mediante forma aliqua, sive huiusmodi mediante, intelligibilium cui uniuntur intelligibilia, sed inest ei pati per solam receptionem. Est enim sicut tabula nuda nihil habens depictionis et propteram non est similiter passibilis scut sensus. (MA. 311, Q312.27ra)

What is controversial in this account of the difference between the senses and the passive intellect is the claim that the senses are altered in sensation. According to commentators in the next decade, neither the sense nor the intellect is altered by receiving species.73 But Rufus consistently adheres to his early position, repeating it in subsequent works.74

16. Magnitude as an Object of the Passive Intellect
Another important difference between sense and intellect is that nothing material can be the object of the intellect. How then can the intellect perceive extended magnitudes? Rufus answers that it is not matter, but privation which impedes intelligibility. But magnitude is logically prior to privation, since magnitude is an immediate consequence of the union of matter and form. Therefore, magnitude can be an object of intellect.

In Phys P9: Et hoc potest patere sic: tria sunt principia corporis naturalis: materia, forma [et] privatio. Sed duo illorum sunt principia substan-

73. Anon., In DAn 3.3, ed. R. Gauthier, p. 481.
74. SAn: “Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio” (Q312.107va).
tae tantum, tertium autem transmutabilitatis. Prius autem secundum naturam est quod per compositionem duorum ad invicem—scilicet, formae et materiae—fiat substantia quam quod per adventum privationis fiat substantia transmutabilis . . . Forma autem adveniens materiae quae est in potentia corpus facit et magnitudinem. (Q 312.1rb)

The Physics account is reprised in In DAn.

In DAn 3.2.3: Dicendum <praem. Et MA> ad primum quod duo <om. E> sunt principia substantivee compositionis secundum quod substantia est, scilicet materia et forma ex quibus constat. Substantiae autem secundum quod naturalis sive mobilis <materialis est MA> tria sunt principia, scilicet materia, <add. et MA> forma et privatio . . . Transmutabilitas igitur in ipsa substantia causatur a defectu dicto sive privatione. Sed prius secundum naturam est ut forma uniatur materiae . . . Ergo <igitur MA> prius secundum naturam est ut sit actu corpus quanquod suae materiae adveniat privatio. Sed privatio <primo MA> est causa conditionum materialium ut mobilitas, contrarietas et huiusmodi. Ergo prius secundum naturam est actu corpus quanquod eis adveniat huiusmodi condicio

How does magnitude become an object of intellect? It can be abstracted without distortion, because magnitude is naturally prior to the mutability brought about by the union of matter and form with privation.75

In Phys P9: Sic patet quod numeros et magnitudo veniunt in esse prius secundum naturam quam adveniat privatio; et propterea prius secundum naturam quam aliqua passio corporis naturalis sive corporis mobilis in quantum mobile. Et propterea possunt numeros et magnitudo abstrahiri, cum nulla passio naturalis sit de eorum essentia; nec est mendacium abstrahentium. (Q 312.1rb)

In DAn 3.2.3: Ergo essentia magnitudinis naturaliter praecedet omnes condiciones materiales a privatione causatas. Ergo magnitudo secundum sui <suam MA> absentiam absolutur ab omni condicio huiusmodi. Si igitur sic intelligatur sive consideratur magnitudo, considerabiltur magnitudo secundum essentiam eius absolutam ab omnibus huiusmodi conditionibus et non prout est cum istis conditionibus. Et hunc considerabili non inedit mendacium. (MA. 318–19, Q 312.27rb)

This view is adopted by Rufus's successors, but they state it differently.76

75. Explanations of natural priority play a considerable role in Rufus's thought. It is his explanation for why we speak of a wooden cube rather than cubic wood—still another parallel between the Physics and the De anima commentaries. See Rufus, In Phys. 7.1.10, Q 312.11ra and In DAn 2.1.4, Q 312.22va.
17. SENSORY OPERATION
Rufus takes his account of the operation of the senses and sensory organs from a section in Aristotle where he is accounting for the capacity of the senses to perceive a variety of sensory objects. In a modern translation, it reads: "sense itself being a sort of mean between the opposites that characterize the objects of perception." The translations available to Rufus were quite different from one another. In the Vetus, he read:

De anima 2.11.424a4: tanquam sensu ut medietate quadam existente in sensibilium contrarietatibus, (ed. K. White, in Anon., In DAn, ed. B. C. Bazán, 2.22, p. 273)

In Averroes, there was the more congenial:

De anima 2.11.424a4: sensus enim est quasi medium inter contrarietatem in sensibilibus (ed. F. Crawford, in Averroes, In DAn 2.118, p. 313)

Rufus added a gloss and adopted a compromise, which is repeated in his other works and subsequently echoed by other authors.

Rufus, In DAn 2.11.4: omnis sensus est medietas quaedam suorum sensibilium, id est organum cuiuslibet. (Q312.25ra)

Once accepted, this tenet is the basis for Rufus's view about how sensory organs are comprised, their nature is so proportioned to their objects, as to be finally completed by the mean proportion (media proportio) of their sensory objects, a view Rufus repeats verbatim in his commentaries on De anima and Physica:

Rufus, In DAn 3.2: Dicendum ad primum quod omnis sensus... sentit mediante organo. Cuiuslibet autem sensus organum... est ipsius organi ultima completio media proportio suorum sensibilium. (Q312.27ra)

Rufus, in Phys. 7.1.16: "Dicendum quod sensus sic se habet mediante organo. Cuiuslibet autem sensus organum... est ipsius organi ultima completio media proportio suorum sensibilium. (Q312.11ra)

18. VISION AND EXTRAMISSION
The activity or passivity of one particular sense organ—the eye—was deeply controversial when Rufus taught. He taught just at the time when under the

78. Rufus, SAn, Q312.107vb.
influence of Alhazen’s Perspectivae, accounts of vision by extramission were losing favor. An odd and interesting aspect of this transitional period is the comparatively minor role played in this process by Aristotle’s views. Why? Because, as Rufus’s works show, it was not clear to early thirteenth-century authors that Aristotle’s views were incompatible with Augustine’s. Rufus is an odd case here, since his views basically do not allow for extramission as is clear from his Oxford theology lectures. Although, Rufus saw reasons not to believe that extramission accounts for vision, he did not find Aristotle explicitly denying it. Indeed some of his contemporaries found passages in which Aristotle seemed to be committed to extramission, as in the famous cause of menstruating women who supposedly damage mirrors by looking at them.

All this left Rufus in awkward position, which is reflected both in his De anima commentary and in his Oxford theology lectures. Although intramission always plays the greater role, Rufus claims that Aristotle does not contradict Augustine, and both extramission and intramission occur.

In DAN 3.11: melius est . . dicere aerem medium pati et immutari a figura et colore . . . quam dicere visum fieri per repercussionem radiorum visualium . . . Et intelligendum quod Aristoteles non intendit negare exitum radiorum ab oculis sed solum intendit quod per huiusmodi radios non fit visus in actu. (MA. 393–94)


Sed quid istud? Nihil tale videtur posse adaptare in anima intellectiva cum intelligit rem distantem. Similiter cum amat, nam nihil potest hic inveniri quod exeat de ipsa anima et progrederetur usque ad rem distantem. Nam etsi dicat quod ipsa intentio animae extenditur usque ad illam rem, nihil est hoc. Nam operatio aliqua animae est illa intentio, et non est operatio absque operante nec absque virtute a qua egreditur operatio, nec est virtus praeter essentiam cuius est virtus” (B62.50rb).

Cited by Albertus Magnus in his Summa de homine as the view of some moderns, this is an awkward position at best, and it cannot have been common.82

19. All Sensibles Reduced to Light

20. Vision as the Paradigmatic Sense

Part of the reason Augustine’s adherence to extramission theory was so troubling to Rufus was the central role played by vision in Rufus’s account of sensation. As we saw earlier, everything acts in virtue of the nature of light. As a consequence, Rufus holds that all sensibles as such have a common root — namely light.

Hence all the particular senses receive light in some extended sense, and that light alters the sensory organs so that they represent sensible species. This sort of light in turn transforms the common sense.

So, according to Rufus, all the senses can be reduced in a certain sense to the sense of vision.

21. Agent Intellect Acts Like an External Light

For Rufus, the analogy Aristotle draws between light and the agent intellect is a controlling metaphor, to which he frequently refers, calling it an "exemplum conveniens." Just as the species of color cannot be seen without external light, so the agent intellect makes imaginables actually intelligible or ideas actual. Light combines with air, as the agent combines with the possible intellect, to produce a seen or understood species. In the quotation which follows, the intelligible species is also described as the intellectus adeptus.

Both in Contra Averroem and in In De anima, the necessity of an external light to illuminate color is likened to the need for the agent intellect to illuminate the species received by the possible intellect.
The proximate object of human understanding, intelligible species, are non natural forms. Unlike natural forms which shape composites in the external world, ideas or species unite with the intellect to produce understanding.

In DAn 3.2.3: Ergo essentia ipsius aquae absolvitur a dictis conditionibus materialibus quamvis non secundum suum esse naturale... Et propterea convenienter dicit quod alter intelligitur aqua quam esse naturale ipsius. (MA. 320, Q312.27rb)

CAv 1.9: Et numquid sic ei inest in quantum et propter hoc quod ipsum est idea et species sola et non natura causata vel ens? Et vide quod etsi idea sit una numero nata sic esse in pluribus simul et semel, non tamen ubique neque in omni, sed in materia sibi propria, intellectu scilicet recipiente. (Q312.83ra)

Referring as he subsequently does in his Speculum animae to “species forms” is new, but distinguishing natural from spiritual being is not. Rufus borrows the phrase “esse spirituale” from Averroes to describe the subtle and immaterial essences characteristic of species present both in the medium through which they pass and the senses. 83

SA n 2: Dicis ergo quod sensibile in obiecto extra habet esse accidentis; in medio vel organo, nec accidentis nec substantiae, quia iterum aliter distinguimus esse solis naturae et speciei. Et haec est distinctio per utilius et necessaria. (Q312.108rb)

In DAn 2.12.6: Sed aliter est in sensitivis; illud enim quod agit in sensum est forma non materialiter existens sed in esse spirituali in medio et in organo. Et propter hoc potest immutare animam sensitivam quae in corporea est. (MA. 250, Q312.25vb)

However, the use of this distinction to explain why some forms are sensed and others are not is characteristic of Rufus. 84 In In DAn, Rufus explains why the sensitive but not the vegetative soul perceives by distinguishing between spiritual and material beings. We perceive things as they exist spiritually and are received in our senses, but not when they are present materially in the organs of the vegetative soul.

In DAn 2.5: Dicendum quod omne organum virtutis sensitivae est quaedam media proortio omnium suorum sensibilium spiritualiter


84. I owe this point to discussions with Calvin Normore, who dealt with the problem in the paper he gave at Bonn in August 2000 entitled “Richard Rufus and the immateriality of the Intellect.”
existentium, et propterea immutatur organum per sensibile iam spiritualiter existens. . . . Sed organum sive subjectum virtutis vegetativa est aliqua proportio contrariorum materialiter existentium, sicut aliquod corpus vere complexionatum in quantum huiusmodi, et propterea forma immutans hoc organum immutat ipsum materialiter et in ipso reperitur materialiter et non spiritualiter. Et propterea istam immutationem non percipit anima. (Q 312.23va)

In his Speculum animae, Rufus tells us that prime matter does not perceive the forms it receives, because it receives only natural forms, not species or ideas:

In DAn 2.5: Et quid de tertia quaestione doces, quare materia prima non comprehendat. Si esset nata recipere ideam obiecti, intelligeret. Sed non est; solum enim recipit et naturam recipit . . . Et hoc est quod materia prima recipit et non recipit speadem vel intentionem illius qualitatis sensibilis. Et ideo materia non sentit. (Q 312.84vb)

As Calvin Normore pointed out in a recent talk, distinguishing between natural and non natural forms enabled Rufus to avoid a common scholastic problem. Aquinas and many others had to explain how one and the same form could both inform the intellect and shape external objects.

23. THE AGENT INTELLECT HAS ALL INTELLIGIBLES
To fit it for the task of abstracting species and illuminating the possible intellect, from the time of its creation, the agent intellect has all intelligibles

In AP 1: anima rationalis ex creatione sua habet omnia intelligibilia . . . Ha-bet ergo haec ratio veritatem quoad hoc quod ponit animam ex sua creatione omnia intelligere (Q 312.30ra)

In DAn 3.3.3: lux vero ipsius formae subtilis posset hoc individuum convenienter assimulare intelligentiae creatae antequam infundatur corpore. Si igitur hoc individuum possit cognoscere suam formam—scilicet, lucem, quia in ipsa luce est natura omnium colorum, in ipsa sua forma complete cognosceret omnes colores. Similiter anima in cognoscendo suam formam, eo quod in ipsa forma sunt quasi vestigia formarum omnium, . . . intelligit omnia. Sed hoc—scilicet, quod in forma ipsius animae vel <aut MA> etiam in forma alicuius intelligentiae relucet <relucat MA> formae omnium—non est nisi in quantum participat formam superiorem—scilicet, primam. (MA. 328, Q 312.27va-vb)

DM et 7: intellectus qui est agens, qui est pars animae nostrae, omnia et semper intelligit actu. (Q 290.21vb)
Some of Rufus contemporaries, by contrast, claimed for the agent intellect only a partial grasp of intelligibles. 85

24. THE AGENT INTELLECT IS PART OF THE HUMAN SOUL

Not only does agent intellect always have all intelligibles from the time of its creation, but it is a part of the human soul. What Aristotle's position on this topic was is still controverted today. In the early thirteenth century, if Roger Bacon is to be believed, most major theologians and ecclesiastical authorities denied this claim. 86 Admittedly, it is hard to know just how common or uncommon Rufus's view was. But the claim that the agent intellect was a separated substance had the backing of Avicenna and the bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne. 87 For most of his career, Roger Bacon followed Avicenna, as did Adam Buckfield and Albert the Great, 88 so it is significant to find clear statements of the view that the agent intellect is part of the human intellect in Rufus's works. Attributing the view to Aristotle and stating it hypothetically are probably signs that Rufus considered the position controversial:

DMet 7: Ad hoc dicendum quod si intellectus agens sit intra et pars animae, non tamen quaecumque intellectus agens intelligit homo in hac vita. (Q 312.21va)

In DAn 3.3.2: illae <istae MA> differentiae, agens et <om. MA> possibile, sunt in ipsa anima secundum Aristotelem. Sic enim arguit: In omni re naturali est reperire in eodem genere aliquid agens et aliquid patiens et aliquid quod sit in ipsa patiente per agens, ergo in anima est invenire haec tria. (MA.326, Q 312.27va)

However, Rufus never considers objections against this position. Throughout his discussion of De anima 3.5, he consistently assumes an internal, but

85. Summa Halesiana 2.372, 2.1:452.
86. According to J. McEvoy, Bacon is wrong about Grosseteste. And Bacon seems to have mistated William of Auvergne's position. Given his unreliability as a witness, it is not reassuring to find that he is the only witness to Adam Marsh's position on this subject. Cf. J. McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste. Oxford 1982, pp. 346–351.
separable agent intellect. Near the end of his arts career he states the claim explicitly:

DMet 11: Dicendum quod uterque—scilicet, intellectus agens et possibilis—est intra et isti sunt intellectus unius et eisdem secundum substantiam et subiectum. (Q290.35rb)

25. HUMANS DO NOT HAVE THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGENT INTELLECT

Though the agent intellect is human not divine, and it always understands all intelligibles, we do not have such understanding. The agent's understanding is not human understanding.

In DAn 3.3: illud intelligere est ipsius animae secundum quod est in se substantia incorporea et debetur intellectui agenti, tamquam efficienti per quem anima hoc intellectu semper intelligit, quod intelligere non est ipsius hominis. (MA. 323)

In DAn 3.3. Item, anima hominis est aliquod individuum creatum et infusum,... per hoc quod continuatur cum imaginatione privatur sive carete intelligibilebus. (MA.327, Q312.27va)

DMet 7: Ad hoc dicendum quod si intellectus agens sit intra et pars animae, non tamen quaecumque intelligit intellectus agens intelligit homo in hac vita. (Q312.21va)

Many of Rufus's contemporaries—men such as Bacon, Albert, and many of their predecessors—claimed for us the knowledge of the agent intellect. By contrast, Rufus held that in this life, the knowledge of the agent intellect is not accessible to us; rather it is present to humans as latent or habitual understanding.

APos 1: anima rationalis...ex coniunctione sui cum corpore eadem retinebit licet non considerabit. Sed demonstratio facit ipsam considerare quod latenter habet. (Q312.30ra)

SOx 1.14: Sed intelligibilia...videtur anima secum naturaliter habere...et semper illorum scientiam habere—in habitu, dico. Et similiter illa


Indeed, the aim of human learning is to be perfectly conjoined with the operation of the agent intellect.

DM et 7: Et quia intellectus qui est agens qui est pars animae nostrae omnia et semper intelligit actu, ideo nostrum addiscere est tendere ad perfectam coniunctionem operationum intellectus agentis in ipso homine. Ex hoc patet quod multa videt illa pars animae quae non videt homo.

(Q290.21vb)

2. DISAGreements ON DOCTRINE

There are also, quite typically for Rufus, differences in views. Most are cases of novel and important developments in Rufus's thought not reflected in his early philosophical works. For example, in the De anima commentary Rufus denies that the soul and its operations are identical, a claim he came to accept fifteen years later as we will see below. Rufus was able to make this change only as a result of carefully developing his position on formal predication. Those views allowed him to claim real identity in the soul without interfering with the special prerogatives of divine unity. Similarly, in In DAn, Rufus found himself unable to affirm the complete substantial identity of the agent and possible intellects, such that they differ only in mode of existence. But in DM et, he accepted this claim. Here again the formal distinction probably played a role. Note, too, that Rufus's position was much more qualified than many of his successors. Rufus continued to describe agent intellect as a part of the intellect, not simply as another name for the whole, which means that he still had reservations concerning the degree of identity that obtained between the agent and possible intellects.

Many disagreements between In De anima and the later works have to do with controversial theses stated and developed for the first time in

90. Rufus, In DAn 3.2: “Ergo illud quod intelligit et illud quo intelligit sunt idem in ipso intellectu. Hoc autem in omni intellectu intelligente impossible est preter quam solum intelligente primo; ergo intellectus non intelligitur <!> per se ipsum et patet quod per aliquam formam sive speciem in eo intelligitur” (MA. 317). Rufus, S0x 1.1M is quoted below.

91. Rufus, In DAn 3.3.3: “Dicendum quod non penitus idem secundum substantiam est intellectus agens et possibilis secundum esse diversa” (MA. 327, Q312.27va).

92. Rufus, DM et 11: “Et ita intellectus possibilis et intellectus agens sunt unius et eadem et idem intellectus licet unus sit in potentia et alterum actu” (Q290.35rb).

93. Anon., In DAn 3.2 q.5, ed. R. Gauthier, p. 469–70.
Rufus's Contra Averroem. They are (1) that the intellect understands not just similitudes, but divine ideas themselves,94 (2) that it is these divine ideas which are universals properly speaking, though they are predicatable only of themselves,95 and (3) that form not matter plays the decisive role in individuation.96 There are no traces of these views in Rufus's In De anima, but that is not surprising. None of Rufus's early philosophical works defend these radical ideas. In his early philosophical works, Rufus seeks to understand and improve on Aristotle, as if to improve on the consistency of his Aristotelianism, but not to challenge his authority. At the end of his philosophical career, just before he became a Franciscan, Rufus shows a strong sympathy with Plato and repudiates 'exculpatory' interpretations of Aristotle.97

These dramatic cases represent major developments in Rufus's thinking, breaks not just with general scholarly opinion but with his own views, which are often painfully considered and reconsidered, in treatises specially written for the purpose, with multiple arguments pro and contra. It is not surprising to find no reflection of such positions in an early work.

3. CONCLUSION REGARDING THE ATTRIBUTION

Richard Rufus of Cornwall is the author of the De anima commentary found in Erfurt 312 and Madrid 3314. There is no scarcity of verbal resemblance, shared technical terminology, and characteristic, even unique positions stated in Rufus's De anima commentary and his other works. The many shared views include theses stated by no other author. Particularly noteworthy are Rufus's position on local motion which continues when contact is lost and his use and development of a theory of formal predication. Taken together the views common to In De anima and Rufus's other works demonstrate a distinctive and coherent philosophical perspective.

Most parallels to the De anima (In De anima) commentary come from Rufus's other early commentaries on Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics (Metaphysics), and

94. In the De anima commentary, we understand species which are mere similitudes, and this is true even when we understand ourselves. By contrast, in Rufus's later Contra Averroem, the description of self-knowledge is complicated and tentative, and the very unusual claim is made that we understand not merely specific similitudes but the very essences or ideas of things. See Rufus, In De anima 3.2, MA.317, as quoted above. Cf. CA v 1, Q 312.83va.


Posterior analytics (In APos)—above all with the closely related Physics commentary. But there are also parallels with the late philosophical works (his Contra Averroëm and DMet, his second Metaphysics commentary) and the theological works (Speculum animae [SAN] and the Oxford lectures on Lombard). There is even a characteristic self-reference from the Oxford lectures. Taken together with the manuscript evidence, and the similarities in genre and citation style, what we know about Rufus’s views in his De anima commentary as compared with his other works, permits confidence in the attribution.

4. DATING

The principal dating tool we have, evidence from an early chronicle on the date Rufus became a Franciscan, 1238, is of limited use. It indicates only that the philosophical works are before 1238 and the theological works thereafter. We do not know when Rufus began lecturing as an Arts master; we can only loosely estimate the dates of his lectures. Even the relative dating of the philosophical works is challenging, since Rufus so seldom cites himself. The few clear cases are as follows: the second Metaphysics commentary cites Contra Averroëm and the Physics commentary, which in turn cites the earliest Metaphysics commentary, Rufus’s Memoriale.

Changes in doctrine provide another key to relative dating. As we saw, prior to Contra Averroëm, Rufus held that the most important cause of individuation was matter, signate matter, a position defended in Rufus’s Memoriale. That early position is reflected in Rufus’s Physics and De anima commentaries. So both these works are prior to Contra Averroëm.

In Contra Averroëm, Rufus also changed his position on species. No longer are they described just as similitudes but as most specific similitudes, a degree of likeness made possible by participation in the divine. On this issue, too, neither In Phys nor In DAn states the mature position; indeed, a strong defense of the earlier position is found in In DAn. Stated by reference to supersimilar, most express, and immaterial similitudes, the

98. Rufus, MM et 7.11, Q 290.49ra.
99. Rufus, In Phys. 2.8.1: “... lux non posset numerare sive multiplicare se sine diapano extra ipsam recipiente ... luces receptae comparentur formae individuatae et multiplicatae per materiam” (Q 312.4vb).”
Rufus, in DAn 3.3.6: “uno modo est multiplicabilis <numerabilis MA> et divisibilis, scilicet per materiam” (MA. 331, Q 312.28ra). But note that though Rufus does not challenge this claim, it is not stated in his own name.
100. Cf. Rufus, In Phys. 7.1.16, Q 312.11ra.
mature position appears only in late philosophical works and early theological works.102

Describing identity and difference in terms of the formal distinction reflects another change of opinion, this time by gradual development rather than by radically revising early views. A comparison of Rufus’s very early M emoriale in M etaph. with his Oxford theology lectures shows how in discussions of the question whether acting and being acted upon can be the same thing, the Aristotelian distinction between what is the same secundum substantiam but different secundum rationem developed into the formal distinction.103 In this case, we find the earlier distinction in the Physics commentary104 and the later (as well as the earlier) distinction in the De anima commentary.105 So it seems reasonable to suppose that the Physics commentary was written before the De anima.

102. Rufus, SAn Q312.108rb.
Rufus, DM et 7.7: “Sed ipsa [species] non est immaterialis nisi per participationem formae quae simpliciter est immaterialis. Igitur qui eam cognoscit, oportet ut cognoscat eam in quantum participat immaterialitatem eius quod est simpliciter immateriale, et hoc est causa prima. Oportet igitur ut cognoscat causam primam ad hoc ut cognoscat eam, et patet sic consequentia. Alio modo sic: omnis natura causata quae quantum est de se et in se est intelligibilis habet speciem sive similitudinem per quam est intelligibilis sive nata intelligi. Species autem alicuius naturae habet esse spiritualis quod non habet suum objectum extra; ipsum enim non potest immediate recipi in intellectu; illa autem species est immaterialis et est aliquid sui objecti a quo gignitur. Unde ipsum objectum ratione illius est immateriale. Cum igitur quaelibet natura causata habeat talam speciem, quaelibet natura causata erit aliquo modo immaterialis, sed non potest esse immaterialis sed per participationem primae causae. Igitur ad hoc ut sciatur ipsa, oportet ut sciatur causa prima” (Q290.14va).

103. Rufus, MM et 11.6: “Vel potest dici alio modo quod sicut actio et passio idem sunt secundum substantiam et magis habent esse in patiente ut in subjecto, et solum differunt secundum rationem, similiter causa et causatum idem sunt et una relatio in subjecto, differunt tamen in ratione” (Q290.53ra–rb).
Cf. Rufus, SOx proem.: “Num video quod quaelibet causa et quaelibet subjectum est secundum substantiam et subjectum et substantiam, definitione tamen et praedicacione formalis differunt? Sicut alit Philosophus: ‘Sensibilis actus et sensus idem quidem est et unus, esse ipsorum non idem’. Dico autem ut est secundum actum et actum secundum substantiam. Et alibi: ‘Quare similiter unus ulla verus actus, scilicet motus et mobilitas, sicut eadem distantia unius ad duo ... Hae quaelibet una est, ratio tamen non una” (B62.12ra).

104. Rufus, Physics 4.3.6: “In solvendo dubitationem de instanti, dicit quod uno modo est idem, sicut secundum substantiam; alterum et alterum, secundum rationem” (Q312.8rb).

105. Rufus, In DAn 2.10: “Dicendum <pos. primum MA> ad primum quod cum dicit gaullabile esse quaelibet tangibile, haec <hoc MA> non est omnino per se, ita quod subjectum et praedicatum sint idem ut sit formalis <formaliter MA> praedicatio, nec est omnino per accidents, ut hoc visibile sive color est quaelibet tangibile; color enim ita per accidents est tangibile quod tangibile secundum tangibile nihil confert ad hoc quod color sit visibile. Gaullabile autem est ita tangibile quod tangibile aliqul confert ad hoc quod sit gaullabile; humidum enim secundum quod tangibile est materia tangibilis. Unde est quasi causalis praedicatio, et sic est aliquo modo per se” (MA. 217-18, Q312.24rb–va).
That suggests the following chronological sequence for the philosophical works. Rufus lectured first on the *Metaphysics* and the *Physics*, then on *De anima*, and finally after composing his *Contra Averroëm*, for a second time on the *Metaphysics*.106

Is Rufus's *De anima* commentary the earliest Western commentary? Alonso thought that the work he edited was the earliest. J. Brams stated a similar view at a conference in Bonn in August 2000. R. Gauthier doubted the claim, neither affirming nor denying it. Specifically, he thought that there were enough references to earlier opinions to show that the commentary could have been part of a Western commentary tradition, in which early maladroit Arts masters participated.107 There are, as Alonso pointed out, not many contemporary references—a total of four in the Erfurt questions, which is one less than was once thought.108 These are references to opinions about whether the agent intellect is human or divine, why men seem to have an appetite for things which are not good, and in what manner sense and intellect can err. Clearly such problems concerned authors who were not engaged in teaching *De anima*, so it is entirely possible that we have a record of the first lectures on *De anima*.

We cannot explain the infrequency of contemporary reference by suggesting that Rufus was an author who preferred not to consider and acknowledge contemporary opinion. In his theological works, Rufus quoted contemporary opinion at length.

Nor does it seem right to conclude from the condemnations of 1210 that Arts masters had already begun commenting on *De anima*, since these condemnations seem to have been aimed at authors who neither commented on nor taught the *libri naturales*.

Was Rufus's *De anima* commentary a record of thirteenth-century teaching? R. Gauthier believes it was not, since new passages are often introduced with the words "Hic intendit," rather than with phrases like "Consequenter cum dicit."109 Here we should note first that there are some such phrases—the appearance of transitional phrases such as "Consequenter dubitatur," "Consequenter quaeritur," and "Consequenter subiungit" may be the result of oral delivery.110 Moreover, texts not introduced by words and phrases like 'consequenter,' 'postea,' or 'cum iam,' but begun simply with "Hic

106. About the commentaries on *De generatione et corruptione* and *Anal. pos.* doubts about dating remain. But it seems likely that *In APos* preceded and *In DGen* followed the *Physics* commentary.
108. What Alonso read as "Propter hoc poterit aliquis dicere" (MA.198) reads correctly in Erfurt: "Propterea poterit aliter dici" (Q 312.24ra).
incipit” or “In ista parte intendit” are also found in Rufus’s Dissertatio in Metaph. Aristot., a work which is clearly divided into lectiones.\textsuperscript{111} Parts of Rufus’s Physics commentary also sometimes open by saying what they are intended to determine, rather than what the author has said or will say next, and it too refers explicitly to a previous “lectio.”\textsuperscript{112} The De anima commentary clearly belongs to the same series, so there is every reason to believe that at least part of it is a record of classroom teaching. But this question is complicated by the double redactions in which Rufus’s commentaries sometimes survive. It may be that some parts of the commentary were, as Gauthier suggests, not delivered orally.

Even supposing, as seems right to do, that Rufus’s De anima commentary was a result of his teaching activity, we do not know who was the first to teach the work. And we are even less likely to learn when the Western written tradition of glossing or commenting on De anima began. What we can say with confidence is that Rufus’s is the earliest known surviving, Western De anima commentary.


\textsuperscript{112} Rufus, In Phys. 8.3.3.: “in fine lectionis nostrae” (Q 312.13vb).