DISTINCT IDEAS AND PERFECT SOLICITUDE: ALEXANDER OF HALES, RICHARD RUFUS, AND ODO RIGALDUS

God’s care for his creatures is perfect. Scripture assures us that God knows each of them individually: *Are not five sparrows sold for two pennies? And not one of them is forgotten before God. Why, even the hairs of your head are all numbered* (Lk. 12:6-7). But most Christians also hold that God’s simplicity is perfect, and prominent theologians of the early 13th century agree that this means that God does not have a different concept or idea for each creature. There is only one divine idea, William Altissiodorensis says; only when we speak allegorically can we accept the view that there are many and diverse ideas in the mind of God (*Summa aurea II tr. I c.2, II:17*). Philip the Chancellor agrees: from the complete simplicity of the divine essence it follows that there is no multitude of divine ideas (*Summa de Bono 56*). On this issue, William and Philip and their later contemporaries had the support of the great 11th century theologian, St. Anselm of Canterbury.¹

Choosing instead to follow St. Augustine,² around 1236 Richard Rufus rejects the consensus of theological opinion at that time.³ In his *De ideis*, he holds that perfect solicitude for individuals requires that we posit many divine ideas—and not just a multitude of


²Augustinus., *De diversis quaestionibus* 83 q.46, CCSL 44a (Turnholt: Brepols, 1975) 71; PL 40, 30.

³Note that there was nothing new about reinterpreting Augustine’s words on the subject in 1235; about 1201 Alexander Nequam considers all the relevant quotations and nonetheless concludes that there is only one idea; *Speculum Speculationum*, ed. R. Thomson (Oxford: British Academy, 1988) 254-255.
universal ideas, but a great multitude of individual ideas. And like Augustine, Rufus identifies divine ideas as Platonic forms. In defending Augustine's views, Rufus does not argue against Anselm. Still a secular philosopher at the time he wrote his De ideis, Rufus directs his arguments instead against Averroës. His tone is respectful: he describes Averroës' position as rational given his other philosophical commitments, but theologically unsound and philosophically mistaken. At the outset, Rufus saw the issue as one which, rather than dividing Christian theologians, pitted pagan philosophers against Christian orthodoxy.

The 13th century theologian who most influenced Richard Rufus initially was Alexander of Hales, a famous Parisian theologian who joined the Franciscan Order. Because Alexander was such an important Parisian master when he joined the order, the event caused a sensation. Rufus became a Franciscan two years afterwards; his De ideis was written about the time when Alexander became a Franciscan in 1236. Alexander's impact on Rufus was profound; his influence on Rufus' early theological work is easy to document, since Alexander is often quoted; but his influence is also strong in Rufus' earliest philosophical work, where he is frequently paraphrased. Indeed in some ways the early influence is stronger, as one might expect, since this is the period when Alexander's fame was at its height, and Rufus was making up his mind to follow Alexander's example and become a Franciscan. But on the issue of the plurality or simplicity of divine ideas, Rufus chose not to follow Hales' lead. Alexander ultimately rejected the suggestion that there are many ideas in God's mind, claiming that it is more perfect to know one thing than many.

So one puzzle confronting us is why in this case Rufus adopts a stance independent of Hales. We will begin by (1) analyzing Alexander's position to see whether there are elements in his discussion which might support Rufus' position. After (2) a brief summary of Rufus' views, we will (3) consider their early reception in

4Rufus, De ideis tr. 1, Erf. Q.312, f.81va: "Numquid ipse Averroës sibi contradiceret eodem passu (Metaph. XII t.52) ubi et haec verba dixit? Ibidem enim dicit quod datio huius largae comprehensionis, scilicet speciei <somnii E> a largo datore primo nobili, non nisi ex perfecta sollicitudine circa homines individuos provenit. Numquid ergo ille dator qui secundum Averroëm est intellectus separatus a materia, cum sit sic sollicitus circa individua, et ipsa intelligit?"
the works of a prominent early Franciscan theologian, Odo Rigaldus, and (4) look briefly at their influence on other medieval theologians. After (5) a few concluding remarks, an edition of two of Rigaldus' disputed questions will be appended.

1. ALEXANDER OF HALES

Alexander’s views on the multiplicity of divine ideas evolved in the 1220’s and 1230’s, a period in which he discussed the subject at least three times. His Glossa was composed before 1227. Before becoming a Franciscan in 1236, Alexander returned to the topic in a disputed question, Quaestio disputata antequam erat Frater 46; his last treatment of the subject probably also took the form of a question entitled De scientia divina. It is not impossible that some of the disputed questions were contemporary with parts of the Glossa. Since, however, in this case the views stated differ considerably, the first and second works we will be considering probably come from quite different periods—I suppose we are looking at views stated about a decade apart—say in 1225 and 1235. In Quaestio disputata 46, Alexander postpones a problem for subsequent consideration in De scientia divina, so that is his last treatment of the problem we are considering here.7

In book I, distinction 36 of Alexander’s Glossa we find straightforward assertions that there are many divine ideas: “Just as many things are known, so there are many ideas (Ef ideo sicut res cognitae sunt plures, ita ideae plures)” (n.5, BFS 12, 358). This statement does not appear unconsidered. Distinction 36 of Peter Lombard’s first book of Sentences8 begins with a question about whether everything in God is his essence; Lombard replies with a simple

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7Unlike the Gloss and the Disputed question, the authenticity of De scientia divina is not certain, though it is very probable, as we will see below and as its editors noted (BFS 19 *37-38). De scientia divina is printed in Quaestiones disputata antequam erat Frater III (Quaracchi: Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1960), Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica (hereafter: BFS 21) 1458-1468.
8Petrus Lombardus, Sent. I d.36 c.1, ed. I. Brady (Grottaferrata: Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1971) 258-259.
distinction between the many things present to God and his simple essence meant to allow for plurality. By contrast, at the outset Alexander cites and assents to a strong statement from Anselm: everything in God is his essence. This makes acute the problem involved in positing a simple being with a multiplicity of ideas. Alexander resolves the problem initially by distinguishing between divine wisdom (sapientia), divine reasons (rationes), and divine ideas (ideae). These words all signify the same thing; they are the really the same. Ideas are the divine exemplars, but they are also eternal accounts or reasons (rationes); and since God’s reasons are eternal, they must even be identified with his wisdom. But ‘wisdom’, ‘account’, and ‘ideas’ differ nominally or according to a manner of speech (modus dicendi). Alexander identifies ‘wisdom’ with what God knows as an efficient cause; ‘idea’ relates to the forms of things; ‘account’, to their final purpose. Wisdom is one since it refers to God’s knowing, while ideas and accounts are many on account of the multitude of creatures known.9 There are many different divine ideas or exemplary forms (n.7, BFS 12, 359). As Alexander subsequently explains: just as the similitudes accessible to a single human soul are multiplied as the number of things known increases, so too many divine ideas correspond to God’s unique wisdom (d.45 n.13, BFS 12, 453-454).10

In Quaestio disputata 46, Alexander’s position changes. He no longer holds that it is strictly speaking true that there are many divine ideas. But though there is no mention of divine wisdom, in many respects the discussion is similar. Ideas and accounts are still supposed to relate respectively to forms and ends. In the Gloss, Alexander had held that wisdom is one as the creator is one, and ideas and accounts are many as creatures are many (n.5, BFS 12, 358). Now he presents ideas as intellectual intermediates between God and creatures, concluding that since an idea is closer to the creator than to creatures, it is one. We may speak of ideas, but to

9n.5-6, BFS 12, 358: “Propter respectum ergo ideae ad formam et rationis ad finem, cum sint formae rerum plures et fines plures, dicunt ideae plures et rationes plures. . . . Dicendum quod dicuntur ideae plures propter respectum creaturarum ad ipsas, non quod sint ab ipsis creaturis, vel ab eis recipient multitudinem.”

10A similar point is made in the second book (d.18 n.7, BFS 13, 161). Wisdom is one and ideas or eternal accounts are many, just as the cause is one and the things caused are many.
speak of 'many ideas' is strictly speaking improper (n.33, BFS 20, 799-800). Alexander also establishes that there is only one account, citing, but not deferring to, Augustine’s claim that there must be more than one, since the account or exemplar corresponding to men differs from that corresponding to horses (n.24-29, BFS 20, 796-798). Whereas in the Gloss, accounts and ideas are properly said to be many (n.5-7, 358-359); in the Disputed question there is said to be, properly speaking, only one.

In Quaestio disputata 46, Alexander mentions and tacitly rejects the Gloss' argument for a multitude of ideas corresponding to the multiplicity of creatures (n.26-31, BFS 20, 797-799). He rejects it in part in deference to a strong statement attributed to Augustine, but closer in fact to a quotation from Anselm: "with the same word he [God] says himself and everything [he] made" (n.31, BFS 20, 799). In the Gloss, Alexander says that though ideas are said to be many on account of the relation creatures have to them, they do not receive their plurality from creatures, since nothing temporal can be a cause of the eternal (n.6, BFS 12, 358). In the Quaestio disputata 46, that caveat drops away. Plurality comes only from the multitude of creatures, and those creatures are not signified, but only "consignified" by the word 'idea' (n.44, BFS 20, 800). Despite many similarities with the position stated in the Gloss, on the crucial issue the view has changed diametrically.

Quaestio disputata 46 leaves unanswered the question how an 'idea' can be both one and many, though there are hints of what was to come in the distinction drawn between "many ideas" and an idea "of many" (n.23, BFS 20, 795). The topic is deferred for discussion in "De scientia" (n.34, BFS 20, 800), and it is in fact taken up early in De scientia divina (n.16, BFS 21, 1461). Ideas are said to be many by consignification (n.20, BFS 21, 1462), so that it is more accurate to speak of "one idea of many things" than of "many ideas" (n.16, 1462). An analogy is made with universals: just as many men are the universal man, and the universal man has only a conceptual unity (unitas rationis), so God's idea has a non-real (multitudo rationis non rei), conceptual plurality (n.16-17.21, BFS 21, 1461-1462). This is a semantic solution of the problem of the one and the many; we are speaking about words and their significates.

11 Quaestiones disputatae antequam erat Frater, appendix 2, q.2 (BFS 21, 1458-1468).
God's simplicity is not compromised because only one idea is signified by the 'divine idea', though it also consignifies the many things imaged by that idea.

As does the Gloss, De scientia divina discusses wisdom as well as ideas and accounts, and the claim is made that ideas are many in a sense in which wisdom is not (n.20, BFS 21, 1462). Alexander refines his position somewhat in the direction of the Gloss, allowing a sense in which there are many ideas—there is a non-real multiplicity which is a consequence of the many things ideated in God's single idea (n.21, BFS 21, 1463). But whereas in the Gloss Alexander sees the assertion that plurality comes from the creatures to which the ideas are related as an absurdity to be rejected (n.6, BFS 12, 358), in De scientia divina he explicitly allows that consequence (n.19, BFS 21, 1462).

As in Quaestio disputata 46, in De scientia divina Alexander claims that ideas are the intermediate concept in the trio—wisdom, idea, and account—which relate God and creatures. Alexander denies that there are ideas proper to each individual in the multitude of creatures, but he allows that there is an account or purpose for each of the many creatures (n.20, BFS 21, 1462). Accounts are said to be proper to many precisely because they are related to temporal creatures (n.17, BFS 21, 1462).

Alexander's concession to Augustine regarding the many eternal accounts is coupled in De scientia divina with an even greater emphasis on the entire simplicity of the divine mind (n.29, BFS 21, 1465) and the identity of divine ideas with the divine essence. Alexander rejects the comparison of ideas in the mind of God to similitudes in a mirror (n.29, BFS 21, 1465).

In one sense there is little change from the first work to the last. Saying, as Alexander does in De scientia, that any multitude in ideas is strictly conceptual, not based on reality (n.21, BFS 21, 1463), is not so different from saying that the differences are not real, but only a matter of speaking, as he had in the Gloss. That is, the account of how something can be both one and many is very similar in these two works. What changes is how reality is characterized. Initially Alexander thought that both plurality and unity came from the divine; in De scientia, he concluded that the origin of the plurality is strictly temporal and creaturely.
In Alexander's works, then, as his ideas evolved they came to resemble more nearly the view of his predecessor William Altissidorensis and his slightly younger contemporary Philip the Chancellor. He came close to simply denying a plurality of divine ideas. At the height of this sort of unitarianism with regard to the divine ideas, Alexander held three characteristic views:

1) The only source of plurality in divine ideas is the temporal (n.17, BFS 21, 1462).

2) God does not understand infinitely many things (n.28, BFS 21, 1464).

3) God's knowledge of singulars is like knowing many in virtue of a single universal (n.29, BFS 21, 1465); he does not have an idea proper to each creature.

Hales' influence on Rufus, however, was greatest at the outset when Hales asserted the multiplicity of divine ideas. This is true despite the fact that in his Quaestio de ideis from the Oxford Sentences Commentary, book I, distinction 36, Rufus quotes most extensively from the De scientia divina, in which Hales denies that multiplicity, and very briefly from the Glossa (Quaestio disputata 46 is not quoted at all). Rufus even quotes De scientia and the Gloss as if they were by different authors. Nonetheless, it is likely that they are by the same author stating different views; the same authorities are cited, closely related distinctions are made, and the same arguments are considered in all three works. So similar are the views that what was very reasonably labeled as a citation from the Gloss by its editors turns out to be a quotation from De scientia (BFS 12, 358, note to num. 5). Only comparison with the De scientia (which was unedited at the time) would allow the correction. Moreover, the basic change in position occurs not between Quaestio disputata 46 and De scientia, but between the Gloss and the Disputed Question, which is undoubtedly authentic and which refers to De scientia by name.

Many aspects of Alexander's position remain the same, even while his position about the issue central to this paper changes diametrically. Even in De scientia, Augustine's statement that nobody who fails to posit ideas in the mind of God can be considered faithful is quoted (n.11, BFS 21, 1461), though not with approval.
That quotation is endorsed on more than one occasion in the earlier Gloss (BFS 12, 357; BFS 13, 2). And that is the claim which seems most to have influenced Rufus—namely, that Christian fidelity requires adherence to the view that there are ideas (and not just one idea) in the mind of God. That is why he sees this as an issue that separates the religious from the irreligious.

2. RICHARD RUFUS

In his De ideis (circa 1236), Rufus addresses not the theological question of divine simplicity, but the philosophical question of whether the separated intelligences generally, and more specifically the first cause, understand sensible individuals. Rufus answers that question by affirming that the first cause knows such individuals, because the first cause is the proper idea of each single creature; he identifies the first cause with a multiplicity of ideas.

That God knows each individual creature Rufus presents as a claim disputed by Averroës, but supported universally by all expositors of sacred scripture. God knows each individual thing, because the species of everything to be created are eternally present to him, even things which are themselves not yet anything independent. The first artisan, who produces everything from nothing, truly knows individuals.

Rufus argues that Averroës cannot consistently claim that God knows only himself. He claims that Averroës contradicts himself, since Averroës holds that God’s gift of intellectual comprehension

12 Rufus, De ideis tr. 4, Erf. Q.312, f.81vb: “Et quis dubitat naturam creatam vere et perfecte cognosci, si fuerit nota eius propria species et idea? Est autem causa prima singulorum creatorum ideae propriae.”

13 Rufus, De ideis tr. 1, Erf. Q.312, f.81va: “Item, prima intelligentia per suam scientiam causa est omnium causatorum; ergo et individuorum. Ergo quia causa vera plenaria omnino prior est causato vel causatis, prius erant individua scita ab intelligentia prima quam ipsa essent omnino. Et ita dicunt universaliter expositores sacræ paginae quod idem causatum, cum sit et cum non sit, in se ipso vere et eodem modo scitur a causa prima.”

14 Rufus, De ideis tr. 1, Erf. Q.312, f.81va: “[I]n his materialibus nisi prius artifex habuerit apud se speciem rei fiendae, numquam probabit res artificiata in esse. Quare multo fortius primus artifex qui omnia ex pure nihil prodit ad esse vere, et speciem creandorum apud se aeternaliter habet, et ipsa quae nondum in se ipsis aliquid sunt, vere cognoscit.”
proceeds from perfect solicitude for individual human beings. But how could God be solicitious about individuals without understanding those individuals?¹⁵

What is more, Rufus claims that separated intelligences could not know themselves if they understood only universal natures. For in that case, they would either have to be universal natures themselves rather than distinct individuals, or else they could not understand themselves. But they must understand themselves, since, as Rufus reminds us, act and substance are indistinguishable in the case of separated intelligences;¹⁶ they are what they understand.

Rufus asks what motivates Averroës’ position, answering that it is based in part on the view that matter is the cause of individuation. Since Averroës holds that matter is unintelligible, he concludes that individuals are unintelligible. But this motivation is insufficient, according to Rufus, since material as well as immaterial entities are understood by means of immaterial species.¹⁷ Whether an object is material or immaterial does not affect the ontological status of the species by means of which we know that object.

In the remainder of De ideis, Rufus proceeds to argue that not only individuals, but even matter as substance (though perhaps not matter as such) corresponds to an idea and is intelligible. So for Rufus, the issue is not only whether God’s mind contains more than

¹⁵Rufus, De ideis tr. 1, Erf. Q.312, f.81va: “Numquid ipse Averroës sibi contradiceret . . .” as quoted above.
¹⁶Rufus, De ideis tr. 1, Erf. Q.312, f.81va: “Item, idem Averroës: non comprehendunt illae intelligentiae separatae nisi naturas universales. Arguo: ergo nec se ipsas intelligent aut non sunt res singulares sed universales naturae. Sed penitus non est probabile quod se ipsas non intelligent, cum, ut prius dictum est, sua actio sua substantia est.”
¹⁷Rufus, De ideis tr. 1, Erf. Q.312, f.81va: “Item, quid movit Averroëm in hac positione? Numquid istud quod individua materialia sunt, eo quod secundum ipsum non sit individuatio nisi propter materiam, et ‘intellectum perfectio est ipsius intellectus,’ et unum sunt in actu intellectus et intellectum? Ergo, si individuum materiale esset intellectum, ipse intellectus intelligens perfectioneret materiali et unum et idem fieret quodammodo cum ipso materiali. Istud autem non videtur cum effectu movere, quia etsi materialia intelligantur per suas species, ... species immateriales sunt necessario, sive sint species rerum materialium sive immaterialium. Ergo hoc non debut ipsam movere rationabiliter.”
one idea, but rather whether there is an idea for each individual—a question which he answers affirmatively.\textsuperscript{18}

Rufus does not deny that what God understands is one. But his answer to the question how something can be both one and many is not like Hales’. The problem cannot be solved by saying that one idea consignifies many things. The problem which faces us is that one idea cannot also be many ideas; to be both one and many is a contradiction. Semantic dodges will not solve this problem. If we are to affirm that what God understands is both one and many, that must happen in a miraculous manner (\textit{miro modo}). According to Rufus, when God understands many things, they are united in a single ultimately simple species, which God apprehends in a single act of understanding.\textsuperscript{19}

That this can be, Rufus argues first by analogy with the operation of created intellects. A created intellect in some sense understands only a single object, itself, a unity comprised of many ideas.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18}But note that that answer is qualified in the case of matter as considered by the philosopher. Cf. Rufus, \textit{De ideis} tr. 1, Erf. Q.312, f.85ra: “De septima quaestione quaerente an substantia materiae ideam habere possit, similiter de unoquoque individuorum, et universaliter cuuius sit idea et cuuius non. In eiusdem septimae tractatu perpenditur quod eius scilicet substantiae-materiae absolutae sit idea et quod individuorum et cuuisliet naturae creatae vel entis causati et non privati. Unde forte materiae prout cadit in consideratione philosophi in quantum huuismodi non est idea, nec in quantum talis est ipsa simpliciter intelligibilis, sed aut sicut privatio vel natura privata secundum quod privata.”

\textsuperscript{19}Rufus, \textit{De ideis} Ad 1, Erf. Q.312, f.84ra-rb: “[N]umquid in te iubes tu hoc sic dissolvere quod in re vera omne intellectum vel est species sola, vel est habens speciem mediante qua intelligitur. Et ipsa species primo est intellectum, secundo illud obiectum cuuius est illa species. Ergo quia tu omnia alia intelligis solum per te speciem—nihil enim ab ipsis recipis—primum intellectum a tuo intellectu et tuus intellectus simpliciter idem [sunt]; secundario intellecta, id est illa obiecta quae per <om. E> te speciem intelligis, ineffabiliter a tuo intellectu diversa. Et hoc dico secundum sua subiecta et secundum hoc quod sunt in se ipsis et suis subjectis et naturis, licet in quantum a te intellecta miro modo in una simplicissima species adunata sint, et ita per consequens in illa una specie unummodo intellectum effecta.”

\textsuperscript{20}Rufus, \textit{De ideis} Ad 1, Erf. Q.312, f.84ra-rb: “primum intellectum a te, sive species per quam alia intelliguntur <intelligitur E> a te, et cuuis intellectus sint simpliciter idem. . . . Nonne verus esset ille <om. E> sermo dicens quod solum illud idolum singulare video, scilicet primo et immediate? Et . . . non repugnarent nec essent plura visa a me, secundum quod talia secundum hoc quod sunt in suis naturis et subjectis plura . . . Et quid de intellectu causato <om. E> recipiente doces? Numquid in ipso
To help us to understand further how many ideas could be united in comprehension, Rufus offers the example of a mirror which reflects many images (*idola*) in a single substance. He suggests that what is seen immediately is a single image by means of which everything else is reflected secondarily.\(^{21}\)

Writing at about the same time as Alexander's *De scientia Dei*, shortly after 1235, Rufus might have adopted Alexander's latest views. Instead he reaffirmed the conclusions stated in Alexander's *Gloss* and defended them against arguments from *De scientia*. In the course of defending a plurality of divine ideas, Rufus denied both that God's knowledge of individuals was in virtue of a universal,\(^{22}\) and that God's knowledge was restricted to finitely many things.\(^{23}\) Positively, he went on claim that there were ideas corresponding even to some of the most unlikely candidates for Platonic forms: individuals and prime matter.\(^{24}\) Compared with the extreme unitarianism of Alexander's mature view, Rufus asserts that:

1) There are many divine ideas, though in some miraculous manner God always understands a single unified idea.

2) God can know infinitely many things.

3) Each individual is known in virtue of its own proper idea.

\(^{21}\)Rufus, *De ideis* Ad 1, Erf. Q.312, f.84rb: "Herum, quid diceris nihil aliud a te intelligere? Nonne et hoc habet suam veritatem, et tamen ista omnia intelligis. Et nonne huius rei conveniens esset exemplum hoc si in speculo corporali per hoc idolum singulare simul et semel conspicere possem omnia visibilia? Nonne verus esset ille <om. E> sermo dicens quod solum illud idolum singulare video, scilicet primo et immediate? Et nonne simul cum hoc corporalia visibilia omnia viderem, et non repugnarent nec essent plura visa a me, secundum quod talia secundum hoc quod sunt in suis naturis et subiectis plura, secundum quod visa in unum idolum adunata ..."

\(^{22}\)Rufus, *De ideis* Ad 1, Erf. Q.312, f.81va: "Item, idem Averroës: non comprehendunt ..." as quoted above.

\(^{23}\)Rufus, *De ideis* Ad 1, Erf. Q.312, f.84va: "Sed a nostro autem <om. E> intellectu non sunt scita infinita. ... A te autem cui infinita sunt finita non video quare, si tibi placet, non sint nomine significabilia."

\(^{24}\)Rufus, *De ideis* Ad 1, Erf. Q.312, f.84vb: "De quaestione quarta et quinta, quaerentibus de individuis et substantia materiae primæ, an sint simpliciter quantum est de se intelligibilia an non, patet in tractatu illarum quod sunt intelligibilia. Et in tractatu quintae [et] septimae quod intelligibilia et quod ideas habent in intellectu recipiente immediate receptas."
Rufus' rejection of extreme unitarianism and of the semantic solution to the problem of one and many is clear enough. Plurality in God's understanding cannot be caused by creatures. What is not entirely clear is his own solution to the problem. He seems to be arguing that simple unity is found in the act of understanding rather than the ideas understood. But as he must have been aware, the utility of the analogy he draws with our intellects is limited. Unlike God, we do understand by reception; the plurality of our ideas does result from the plurality of the objects we understand, objects which are not identified with us. As Rufus has pointed out, this is not the case for God and his eternal ideas. God eternally understands only himself in a sense in which we understand things outside ourselves. So what we have is little more than the assertion that God's ideas are united insofar as he understands them. It looks as if a plurality of ideas would make the object of God's understanding composite, which is a problem, assuming both that God's act is God's substance and that God's essence is simple.

That was the situation in 1235, and a couple of years later the difficulties involved seem to have persuaded Rufus to retreat, adopting the common view that plurality in divine ideas comes only from creatures. But fifteen years later, discussing ideas as an Oxford theologian, Rufus returned to a defense of a plurality. As before, he opposed extreme unitarianism. Faced with the claim that God could not know infinitely many creatures, Rufus adduced Augustine's authority in support of the view that from a human perspective God does know infinitely many.

Rufus seems to have thought that some of Hales' arguments for extreme unitarianism were self-refuting, since rather than replying to some of them, he simply recites Hales' own words against him.

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25 Rufus, De ideis Ad 1, Erf. Q.312, f.84ra-rb: "[N]umquid in te iubes tu . . .," as quoted above.


27 Here Rufus states and replies to an argument from Alexander's De scientia Dei (n.28, BFS 21, 1464) Sent. Ox. 1 d.36, Balliol 62 f.80vb: "Item, melius est ponere finita quam infinita, et unum quam multa si possibile est. Sed possibele est multa cognoscere per unum, sicut patet in uno universali cognoscuntur multa singularia, et in una causa multa causata, ergo videtur decentius et congruentius poneretur unica esse idea quam plures. —Supra tamen habitum est ex Augustino, De civitate Dei, quod 'in sapientia Dei sunt infinita quaedam.'"
So for example, Hales sees no difficulty in claiming that something singular can be many as it is understood. By contrast, for Rufus that would be assenting to a contradiction—just the sort of thing which makes it vain to think at all.28

In 1250 Rufus was aware that his views were under attack. In *De scientia Dei*, Alexander argues that the mirror analogy does not allow us to understand how many divine ideas could be unified: For a mirror’s light (or splendor) comes not from the extended surface, but from the things reflected therein (n.29, BFS 21, 1465). Indeed, Alexander probably saw the example of the mirror as an analogy which supported his view that the multiplicity of divine ideas was caused by the things known, not by the knower.

For Rufus that unitarian thesis is untenable, because it mistakes the direction of causation; it would be absurd for something eternal to be caused by something temporal, as Hales himself had held earlier (n.6, BFS 12, 358).29 As the creator, it is God who causes diversity in creatures; it is not they who cause variety in the divine ideas.30 In reply to the objection that a minimal distinction should not cause major distinctions, Rufus argues that the most

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28 Rufus, *Sent. Ox.* I d.36, Balliol 62 f.80vb: "Item, 'si sunt multae ideae, aut re, aut ratione. Si re, ergo multae res sunt ab aeterno. Si ratione, istae rationes aut sunt res, aut intellectus. Si res, idem inconveniens quod prius. Si intellectus', cassus videtur intellectus cum 'ponat multitudinem ubi non est'.

Alexander, *De scientia Dei* (n.21, BFS 21, 1463) quoted against itself: "si intellectus, videtur quod intellectus componat multitudinem ubi non est.—Respondeo: Est multitudo rationis et multitudo rei. Prima est in idea, et ratio est ex multitudine in ideatis, nec ponit multitudinem in idea, sed in comprehensione ideae. Neque proper hoc intellectus est *cassus* et vanus, quia nullam in substantia ideae multitudinem ponit, sed in eo quod ad eam dicitur."

Note that in the subsequent literature there are frequent denials that this kind of simultaneous unity and plurality makes it vain to think. Cf. Bonaventure, *Sent.* I d.35 q.3, I 608b and Kilwardby, *Sent.* I q.76, ed. J. Schneider (Munich: Bayerischen Akademie, 1986), 245.

29 Rufus, *Sent. Ox.* I d.36, Balliol 62 f.80vb: "Et dicit forte quod sicut res istae causatae sunt plures, sic et relations istorum ad Deum sunt plures, et sic ideae per consequens secundum rationem plures. —Sed contra secundum hoc esset 'temporale causa aeterni', si scilicet propter multitudinem causatorum solum dicuntur ideae multae." Quoting Alexander (*De scientia Dei* n.14 & 19, BFS 20, 1461, 1462) against himself.

30 Rufus, *Sent. Ox.* I d.36, Balliol 62 f.81rb: "Non haec deffiniendo dico, nam ut puto, humanum excedit intellectum harum rationum et divinorum spectaculorum comprehension et determinatio. Sed, sive hoc modo sive quocumque alio assignentur, distinctionem aliquem inter se habere videntur aeternam non causam ex multitudine istorum sed potius e converso. Ideo sunt haec multa et diversa, quia suo ineffectili modo distinctae sunt hae rationes."
minimal distinction in the divine can cause major differences in creatures.\textsuperscript{31}

Counter attacking, Rufus claims if there were only one divine idea, according to which creatures could be fashioned—one exemplar—then there could be only one creation; or perhaps none.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, if God knew creatures only according to one idea, he would not know one as distinct from another; he would know creatures only confusedly,\textsuperscript{33} and consequently perfect solicitude for individual creatures would be impossible.

In response to the major argument for the opposite position, the claim that there can only be one idea, since the essence of God is one, Rufus presents a new solution to the problem of one and many. He argues that the difficulty here is comparable to the difficulty of understanding how many attributes could comprise a single essence.\textsuperscript{34} Both cases exceed human understanding.\textsuperscript{35} However, to make the situation philosophically intelligible, Rufus presents a
formal distinction. God's wisdom is his power; his power, his goodness, and so on, yet each attribute has a different formal definition. One attribute cannot be formally predicated of the other, and so the divine attributes are distinguishable from each other and therefore in some sense many. By analogy, God's essentially unified ideas are distinct by formal predication. That is Rufus' general solution to the problem of how aspects of a unified and simple nature can be distinguished.

Regarding the fundamental theological issues, Alexander and Rufus do not disagree. Both hold that God knows creatures by knowing himself, and that God's providential solicitude extends to individuals. The dispute is about how this is possible, and about how to understand Aristotle. Hales claims that it was no great error when Aristotle held that God understands only himself, since to do otherwise would vilify his intellect. Aristotle merely did not understand that the purpose of divine knowledge of individuals is not to perfect the first cause, but to provide for individuals. Aristotle just failed to notice that no one was claiming that external objects God understands were more noble than God (n.33-35, BFS 21, 1465-1466). As usual Alexander is tolerant, but not very sophisticated in his exposition of Aristotle; unsurprisingly, Rufus did not care to follow his lead.

Note that Rufus does not correct Alexander high-handedly or advert to Alexander's superficial understanding of Aristotle; he is his usual deferential self, anguishing over the difficulties presented by the problem, not daring to assert his opinion. But in 1250 as in 1236, Rufus holds that since God knows and cares about individuals, we must posit distinct divine ideas.

3. ODO RIGALDUS

Fortunately for Rufus, his own views also met with respectful attention, even if they did not gain general assent. Rather the denial of multiplicity characteristic of Alexander's late works was adopted in the Franciscan school at Paris by his immediate successors. This can be seen both in the Summa Halesiana36 and in the works of Odo Rigaldus. The Summa itself is a pastiche. Where

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36 Alexander de Hales, Summa theologica I n.272 III; n.175 I-II (Quaracchi: Coll. S. Bonaventurae, 1924), I 369, 258.
the question is treated *ex professo*, at n.175, most of the *Summa* is taken verbatim from the *Gloss* (357-360); the more modern development of the view found in n.272 seems to derive from Odo, mentioning as it does the term 'connotation' characteristic of that author's treatment of this issue.

Alexander's immediate successors deny a multiplicity of divine ideas; talk about many ideas is strictly speaking improper, since what is signified is one. Only insofar as reference is to the other beings connoted by divine ideas can it be said that there are many ideas. The use of the term 'connotation' is new, but plainly this is substantially the same position defended throughout Alexander's works. Ideas are said to be many only because of their relation to many creatures, which they *consignify*, but strictly speaking do not signify.

The early Franciscan school persisted in the view that this issue was not a major disagreement dividing pagan philosophers from Christian theologians. Though Odo does not say, as Alexander had said, that the Philosopher has made no great error, Odo follows Alexander in his interpretation of Aristotle. When Aristotle says that if God were to know something other than himself that would degrade his intellect, that is not intended to show that God does not understand others, according to Odo. Not knowing others, but perfecting the intellect by knowing others, would degrade God's understanding. Aristotle is not denying that God understand others, but that such acts would be perfective acts for God, as they are for us.37

Odo's stance was of considerable significance. Not well known today, Odo Rigaldus when he died in 1275 was as celebrated as St. Bonaventure. He entered the Franciscan order in 1236 or before, became regent Master at Paris in 1245, was one of the celebrated four masters commissioned by the Order to comment on the Rule, and was named Archbishop of Rouen in 1248. A close advisor of

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37Rigaldus, *Sent.* I d.35, Paris. B.Nat. 14910 f.89rb: "Ad aliud dicendum quod illud quod dicit Philosophus, quod si primum cognosceret alius a se, vilescet eius scientia, intelligendum est si cognosceret alius sicut perfectivum sui intellectus; et ideo etiam dicit quod tunc vilescet. Unde non vult negare quod primum <add. non P> intelligat alia a se, sed quod intelligit ea sicut perfectiva sui intellectus sicut nos."
Louis IX, whom he accompanied on crusade, Odo like Bonaventure played a prominent role at the Council of Lyons.\(^{38}\)

As the selections from his *De ideis* printed at the close of this article show, Odo was a competent scholar as well as an accomplished ecclesiastical diplomat and administrator. The *Sentences* commentary quoted above dates from before 1245, while the questions printed in an appendix here come from *De ideis*, a question disputed at Paris between 1245 and 1248, about ten years after Rufus' *De ideis*. Both works show us an able theologian with considerable interest in logic, who explicates scripture (*Ioean*. 1:4) by reference to contemporary views on reduplication. Both Aristotle and Plato are cited. Like Rufus, Odo also cites Anselm favorably and quotes endless passages from Augustine. Clearly Odo and Rufus belong to the same intellectual milieu, and both are influenced by Philip the Chancellor as well as John of La Rochelle and Alexander of Hales.\(^{39}\)

Initially, Rufus does not seem to have had much influence on Odo—that is, there is no evidence that Rufus' circa 1235 *De ideis* influenced Odo's pre-1245 *Sentences* commentary on this topic (though that would be entirely feasible chronologically speaking). On the other hand, Odo's pre-1248 *De ideis* was deeply influenced by views very similar to those stated by Rufus' circa 1250 *Oxford Sentences* commentary. Among the arguments for multiplicity cited by Odo are some which could very well have come from Rufus' early philosophical work—such as (1) the claim that multiplicity in creation must come from the exemplars in accordance with which they are created, because it cannot come from matter; and (2) the related claim that if all creatures were produced in accordance with a single idea, they would all be similar to each other. Similarly, Odo's rejection of unitarianism could have come from Rufus' earliest philosophical works as well as his Oxford lectures. But the argument which most deeply influenced Odo is not found in Rufus' early philosophical work. It is the argument that God could not know one creature as distinct from another in accordance with a


single idea common to all creatures, and therefore he must know creatures in accordance with many ideas.

How might this be? There are two possible explanations: First, these arguments were presented by theologians other than Rufus, and it is they, rather than Rufus, who influence Odo's disputed question. Second, the same arguments Rufus presented at Oxford he may have presented in another early work with which we are not yet very familiar—quite possibly in the pre-1238 *Metaphysics* commentary. Conceivably both explanations are correct: There are versions of the distinct knowledge argument for multiple divine ideas in works authored by Richard before 1248, and Odo was chiefly influenced by others who advanced this argument. But though there are clearly others who argued for the multiplicity of divine ideas, so far as I know the argument from distinct knowledge of singulars is not presented. However the facts are to be explained, the direction of the debate is clear. Arguments from the diversity of creation failed to influence Odo's opinion; but arguments from the distinctness of God's knowledge succeeded in part.

Rufus, and the others who must have advocated similar views, did not persuade Odo Rigaldus that there are many ideas in the mind of God; they made a lot of progress, however. Indeed, all of the theses of Alexander's extreme unitarianism were abandoned. First to go was Alexander's concession that the temporal can act on the eternal as a principle of understanding; it was withdrawn even in the *Summa Halesiana* (I n.175 III, I 258). However, the *Summa* has nothing to say about the other two issues: whether God understands infinitely many things, and whether God's understanding of individuals is like knowing many in a universal.

Next to go was the thesis that God does not know individuals, or rather that God knows singulars confusedly by way of universals. Even in his *Sentences* commentary, Odo rejects the view that it is better for God not to know small insignificant individuals directly. On the contrary, knowing singular material objects is a noble attribute, to be affirmed of God.40

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40Rigald., Sent. I d.35, Paris. B.Nat. 14910 f.89rb: "Ad hoc dicendum quod Deus cognoscit tam magna quam parva. Et dicendum ad primum obiectum quod non est ratione immaterialitas intellectus nostri quod non potest per se cognoscere singularia et primo sed per sensum apprehendit illa, nec hoc est nobilitatis in ipso, sed impotentiae et ignobilitatis. Si enim primo et per se, id est non mediante sensu, posset
By the time of Odo's *Disputed question*, the denial that God understands infinitely many things (at least from a human perspective), characteristic of Alexander's *De scientia Dei*, has been replaced by the contrary assertion. Knowing or creating many only in virtue of a single universal is a sign not of divine omnipotence but of creaturely impotence. God knows infinitely many individuals in a single intuition, and has an idea proper to each individual (366–370).

Odo considers the main problem—in what sense there are a plurality of divine ideas—in two separate questions, questions 3 and 7. Question 3 asks whether many ideas are to be posited in the mind of God, and answers in the negative. Question 7 addresses the question whether there are particular as well as universal ideas in God, and answers in the affirmative. Despite appearances, Odo maintains the same view consistently throughout. Multiplicity in divine ideas results from God's relation to many creatures and does not entail a real plurality of ideas. Names like 'idea' signify God's essence and connote a relation to creatures. Though the thing signified is utterly simple, 'idea' can be used in the plural, because of the multitude of creatures. The suggestion is even made that this plural usage is a result of human imposition. (100–118).

In question three, Odo rejects arguments which seek to show that God must have many ideas in order to create distinct creatures. In question seven, Odo affirms that God knows each creature distinctly and denies that God knows only universals.

Odo justifies rejecting the creator arguments by claiming that they confuse God's role in creation with that of a human producer (*artifex*). In the case of God, to say that he is the exemplar of things is no more than to say that he knows what and how he can produce all possible creatures. Since God is himself the exemplar, whatever he produces is radically different from him. God is not like a craftsman with a limited supply of designs, but can produce any number of different creatures from the same idea (188–207).

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*intellectus cognoscere singulares ut totum fieret per intelligentiam puram quod fuit per intelligentiam simul et sensationem, dico quod nobilior esset . . . Quia ergo hoc [quo] non posset intellectus humanus non est nobilitatis in ipso, et ideo non est Deo attribuendum et ideo illa ratio non procedit a minori affirmatione, immo negatione.*

41Here and in subsequent citations, reference is to line numbers in the appendix, where questions 3 and 7 of Odo's disputed questions, *De ideis* are edited.
Odo’s acceptance of the distinct knowledge arguments appears to have been unplanned. They appear as principal arguments to be refuted, and are accepted instead. The first is based on the claim that knowing a universal does not permit one to distinguish (256–260). Another claims as (Rufus does) that in knowing singulars, God knows all their causes including matter (267–273). In his reply to the question, Odo says that there are distinct and proper ideas for each singular, though it is also true that there is only one simple idea (303–308). Odo’s reason for accepting plurality by relation is that otherwise he cannot account for God’s knowing many. If God knew discursively, then he could know many indirectly by virtue of knowing one; but God does not know discursively—rather God knows directly by absolutely precise likenesses (308–315).

So though the creator/artisan arguments are rejected, the knower arguments for a plurality of ideas are accepted in a qualified manner. A connotative plurality in divine ideas is accepted. Odo, like Rufus, affirms that Augustine was correct to hold that God has an idea corresponding to each of us, that God’s ideas include accounts (rationes) of all singulars and accordingly God knows them with utter distinctness (verissime et distinctissime).

Odo's discussion does not represent straightforward progress for Rufus’ point of view. When it comes to the problem of one and many, Odo advances a version of the semantic solution advocated by Alexander in his later works; rather more than Alexander he emphasizes that the manner in which ‘idea’ can be said in the plural is a result of God’s relation to creatures.

Odo does not consider Rufus’ formal solution to the problem of one and many. He does, however, consider a Platonic solution. On this view, creatures are ordered according as they participate more or less in the one. There is a single exemplar idea and an ordered multitude of creatures which more or less closely resemble it. That solution is rejected, however, in part because it suggests that God cannot produce creatures with opposite traits, but only with traits more or less like the perfect original (165–185).

Nonetheless there has been some movement in Rufus’ direction. All of the extreme unitarian theses are rejected. And even the presence of such a careful and detailed discussion of the arguments for a multiplicity of divine ideas may have seemed a good sign to
Rufus. Odo's pre-1245 *Sentences* commentary does not even explicitly address itself to the question, which presumably was regarded as settled in favor of the view that there was only one divine idea. After 1245, Odo spent pages on alternate replies to a single argument and seemingly conceded others.

4. ON RUFUS' SUBSEQUENT INFLUENCE

Clearly the position advocated by Rufus was taken seriously. As we shall see, Alexandrine extreme unitarianism was commonly rejected. Franciscans like St. Bonaventure did not accept Alexander's thesis that temporal objects could cause plurality in God's knowledge. Bonaventure also explicitly rejected the suggestion that God knows many singulars in something like a single hyper-universal, affirming instead that individuals are known (q.4, 610s). Finally, Bonaventure affirms that God knows infinitely many things, rather than knowing one finite thing (q.5, 612a-b). Like Rufus and Odo, Bonaventure allows that there is an idea for matter (q.2, 629b).42

Where Rufus and Odo disagree, however, Bonaventure follows Odo. Bonaventure begins in distinction 35 by reciting a position which somewhat resembles Rufus' according to which God's ideas are really distinct. That opinion he describes as initially plausible, but ultimately mistaken. Indeed, Bonaventure seems initially to reject even the position of Alexander and Odo, according to which ideas are many in virtue of the relation to the many creatures they consignify or connote (q.2, 605b). But in the next question, he asserts that though there is only one essence (*quid*), there are many ideas (q.3, 608b). Bonaventure accepts Odo's connotation theory (q.3, 608b), but he makes fewer concessions to the distinct knower arguments than Odo. Bonaventure emphasizes that God's many ideas are not really distinct. He accepts the main point—God knows distinctly in comparison to objects—but seeks to mute its consequences; he denies that God's cognition is distinct (q.2, 607b).

When lecturing on the *Sentences* according to Bonaventure, in the last lectures Rufus gave, at book I distinction 35, he states both

the formal solution to the problem of one and many and the common view. He rejects the view that the plurality of divine ideas results from the multitude of creatures connoted, on the grounds that the temporal cannot cause the eternal. Rather the plurality of divine ideas is a result of the precise formal signifícate of ideas. Different ideas signify the same essence under different descriptions.43

Coming to distinction 36, Rufus quotes Bonaventure at great length on a related question: in what sense the many things in God’s mind are his life, a divine attribute (cf. BFS 12, 220). Here Bonaventure distinguishes three modes in which things can exist in God.44 Rufus is respectful, and he says that Bonaventure’s view is probable. According to that view, there is a sense which the creatures exemplified in God are God’s life.45 But after the long quotation comes a brief paragraph in which Rufus prefers another more radical solution. He claims the support of Augustine and Peter Lombard for the view that creatures are not in God’s essence. What is in God’s essence is only the ideal cause of creatures. Their ideal cause can be identified with God’s life. But though creatures are similar to their ideas, we need not concede that they are those ideas in God.46

Greatly influenced by Rufus’ Parisian theology lectures, Robert Kilwardby agrees with Rufus that God knows distinctly, affirming explicitly that there is a ‘real distinction’ between God’s ideas, if and only if we extend the sense of that phrase to modes of reality, or accounts; ideas are then understood to be modes (modi) in the mind of God.47 The identification of exemplar forms or ideas as

43Rufus, Sent. Paris. I d.36, Vat. lat. 12993 f.87va.
44Bonaventure, Sent. I d.36 a.2 q.1, I 623-624.
45Rufus, Sent. Paris. I d.36, Vat. lat. 12993 f.90vb.
46Rufus, Sent. Paris. I d.36, Vat. lat. 12993 f.90vb-91ra: “Et plura sunt hic probabilia, sed breviter sine praeiudicio ad problema propositum potest respondi, ut iam dictum est, per Augustinum et Magistrum quod creatura non est in essentia Dei. Et illud exponendum est quod factum est in ipso vita erat, id est habet causam idealem in Deo quae est vita, cui ideae ipsa creatura quoquo modo similis est, ratione cuius similitudinis licet minima sit numerabili modo loquendi dicitur ipsa creatura esse ipsa idea in Deo. Quia alius esse non habet creatura in essentia Dei quam esse suae causae ideals, sed non propter hoc absolute concedendum est quod creatura sit vita divina vel essentia.”
47Kilwardby, Sent. I q.75-76, ed. J. Schneider (Munich: Bayerischen Akademie, 1986), 242-245. See especially q.76, 244-245: “Dicunt hic quidam quod ideae sunt plures realiter, non accipiendi rem pro essentia, sed pro modo rei vel ratione . . .
‘modes’ is an approach characteristic of Rufus, which he credits to Seneca.48

On the theses about which Rufus and the late Alexander disagreed, Kilwardby clearly accepts those of Rufus. He argues that it is not more perfect to know by one than by many ideas; since it is impossible that more perfect knowledge could result from only one idea, according to Kilwardby. Instead of positing a hyper-universal, Kilwardby argues (citing Augustine) that God, though one by essence, is many by account. Plurality and distinction in creation comes from divine ideas, and not vice versa.49 An entire question is devoted to alternative ways of defending the view that there are infinitely many divine ideas.50

Kilwardby did not, however, endorse Rufus’ claim that we need not explain in what sense creatures exist with God. Nor does this suggestion appear to have had any other immediate influence. Theologians asked not whether creatures existed with God, but what their mode of existence there was. As far as I am aware, Ockham’s decision to solve the problem by cutting the Gordian knot is uncommon: Creatures do not exist with God; that their exemplar causes are in God does not imply that they themselves exist in God. Of course, Ockham’s justification for taking this step is different from Rufus’. But like Rufus, Ockham both affirms that God knows each individual creature distinctly and denies that God’s ideas are his intellect (OTh IV, 492-493).

Rufus’ unusual position on divine ideas had some limited success. It was dealt with respectfully and produced accommodations in the common opinion: extreme unitarianism was abandoned; and distinct knowledge of creatures in God was generally posited. Based as it was on a fundamentally theological commit-

Securius autem videtur dicendum tertio modo . . . Communius pro ratione et modo intelligendi et sic est pluralitas realis in ideis . . . Et tunc potest dici quod est ibi pluralitas realis, si extendatur nomen rei ut pro modo rei et ratione supponat.”

48 Rufus, Sent. Ox. I d.36, Balliol 62 f.81rb: “Sed ais: ergo quaevis una ratio est essentiale in Deo.—Quod verum est, et tamen non sequitur propter hoc quod non sit pluralitas idearum, sicut nec ex parte spectaculum, nam etsi sint idem, distinguibiles tamen modi sunt inter se, licet quilibet modus sit tota Trinitas; et modos vocat eas Seneca, ut patet supra et etiam Averroës.”

49 Kilwardby, Sent. I, q.75, 242.

50 Kilwardby, Sent. I, q. 77, 247-250.
ment to God's perfect solicitude for creatures, Rufus' position substantially influenced early Franciscan theology.

5. CONCLUSION

The unity and plurality of divine ideas is a philosophically interesting theological topic. The historical development of the debate is also important for what it shows about the development of the Franciscan school, which is here characterized by great shifts. In 1225, Alexander, at least, took the plurality of divine ideas for granted. By the time of his death twenty years later in 1245 (BFS 12 74*), both he and his students defended the opposite view magisterially as a settled truth. After 1245, however, Odo not only follows Rufus in arguing for ideas of individuals, but also accepts the view that distinct knowledge requires distinction in ideas.

Rufus' own views seem to have been fixed by what he heard first from Alexander. Oddly, Rufus defends Alexander's most old-fashioned views against more modern semantic stratagems. Rufus partly, but only partly, convinces his confreres. On the subject of the mode of creaturely existence with God, ever more complicated theories were explored—Scotus' treatment being particularly remarkable in this respect.\(^{51}\) It is Ockham, who is not likely to have read Rufus' theological works, who agrees that we do not have to ask about the mode of creatures' existence in God, since they aren't there.

What motivates Rufus primarily are theological considerations and a high regard for Augustine's authority. From first to last Rufus' concern is to protect the Christian claim that God is perfectly solicitous about each individual creature. Accordingly, Rufus defends the plainest interpretation of the Augustinian texts which support the claim that there are many divine ideas or accounts. Through all the sophisticated interactions with Aristotle, Averroës, Odo, and Bonaventure, Rufus persists in defending the simple view initially stated in Alexander's *Gloss* around 1226: God's ideas are many, though his wisdom is one. Rufus' persistence

in defending this view shows the importance of the Quaracchi edition of that Gloss for understanding later scholasticism.

Indeed, this case study as a whole illustrates the value of the work done by Fr. Gedeon Gál and his socii at Quaracchi and Grottaferrata for an understanding of the Franciscan contribution to the Western theological tradition. Without their work, we would not even know of Alexander's influence on Rufus; what little we would know about Alexander's life would be virtually undocumented. We would probably have to decide between entirely disregarding the *Summa Halesiana* and accepting uncritically a work which, though based in large part on Alexander's views, was certainly not composed entirely by Alexander. We would not know how the Franciscan school started out, and so we could not accurately describe its subsequent development. Even if Fr. Gedeon had not worked on later Franciscans at all, his would be a seminal contribution to the history of philosophical theology. Since he has also helped bring us so many other works—works by Adam of Wodeham, John Duns Scotus, Richard Rufus, Matthew of Aquasparta, and above all William of Ockham—his is a contribution of unrivaled significance.

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