[225-229] Subsequently let us ask about [Aristotle’s] statement that accidents are not entities except because they belong to an entity. For if these accidents are entities in no other way nor for another reason, I can truly say that accidents are not entities. For it is false to say that $A$ is $B$ since it belongs to $B$, just as [it is false] to say that a horse is a man since it belongs to a man.

[230-233] To the same [point]: If accidents are not entities except because they belong to an entity, then this accident will not be an entity except because it belongs to this entity. But to say that ‘this accident is an entity because it belongs to this’ is false, since then it would follow that it would be this entity, since it is not any other entity. Therefore, the first [statement] is false.

[234-240] To the same [point]: An accident, considered absolutely in itself, either is or is not a nature. If not, then it is not an entity. If so, then it is not the whole of the other [thing] to which it belongs as it is. For if so, we could not understand one absolute nature in itself; and even if it were [the whole] of the other [to which it belongs], it would not be another nature. Therefore, an accident is no nature per se, and therefore no entity. How,
then, should we posit the ten categories of things? And also, a science based on accident would not be a science.

[241-242] But now the conclusion seems false; for ‘line’ indicates a nature in itself different from the nature of substance, and it is an accident.

[243-247] In reply to this we must say that an accident, leaving aside every nature of substance, is nothing other than the being (esse) of that substance. But that being is the accidental potential of matter in virtue of which it can be here and there, and therefore the nature of accident is not distinct from the nature of substance, but it is merely its being.

[248-251] In reply to the objection we must say that none of these names [such as] ‘color’ [or] ‘line’ is removed from the signification of substance. And if every nature of substance were circumscribed from the name ‘color’, only the accidental being of that substance would remain.

[252-254] In reply to the other [objection we must say] that accidents are entities as entity is derived from being, and that mode is the logical mode of saying ‘entity’ and not the true [mode]. But the true mode derives being from entity.

SMet 7.2.Q1 (excerpt)

[429-432] Let us ask about the Commentator’s statement that if we knew what is the quiddity of a given sensible substance (substantia sensibilis demonstrata), we would know the first cause of everything. Namely, [let us ask] what sort of inference this is and in what way it holds.  

[433-448] And someone will say that this is the reasoning behind the inference: since nothing caused is perfectly known unless the first cause is known, if we know the quiddity of a given sensible substance, we must know the first cause. That nothing caused is perfectly known unless the first cause is known is evident as follows: for every given caused thing, that which is caused is either immediately caused by the first cause or not. If so, it cannot be known unless the first cause is known. If it is not immediately caused by it, it will have another cause immediate to it. Therefore, it cannot be known unless that immediate cause is known. But that cause, since it is not the first cause, will have another cause, but that other [cause] is [either] the first cause or another. If it is the first cause, then we must know it in order to know the cause of that caused thing, and thus we have what we proposed to show. If it is another [cause], we must similarly seek for it until [we reach] the first cause. And so, necessarily, from knowledge of any caused thing will follow knowledge of the first cause.

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2 Averroes, In Metaph. 7.5: “And [Aristotle] expanded this question, since if we knew what the quiddity of that substance was, then we would know the first cause of all entities.” (ed. Iunt. 1562, 8: 155vb-156ra).
But this is no solution, for it assumes that it is possible to know a thing perfectly in this life, that is, in the way that is possible to know it. But this way of knowing is not possible in this life, and therefore this solution assumes something false.

And therefore we must say that an accidental form is not an entity except insofar as entity is derived from being. Hence, it is only the being of matter and not some nature in itself. By contrast, a substantial form is the being and the act of matter, and apart from this it is some nature in itself. And since it is some nature in itself, it is necessarily immaterial in this respect. Hence, regarding something of itself it is immaterial, for if it were wholly material, it would neither be an absolute nature in itself nor would it differ from an accidental form. Therefore, regarding something of itself it is immaterial, and regarding something [else] of itself it is material. Therefore, if someone knows it he must know it insofar as it is material and insofar as it is immaterial. But it is not immaterial except in virtue of its participation in the form that is absolutely (simpliciter) immaterial; therefore, someone who knows it must know it insofar as it participates in the immateriality of that which is absolutely immaterial, and that is the first cause. Therefore, he must know the first cause in order to know it, and in this way the inference is evident.

Subsequently [Aristotle] shows that accidents have a definition in some way, saying that the expression (sermo) for an accident, be it complex or incomplex, always signifies a this-in-this (hoc-in-hoc). However, a definition states what [something] is; but the expression for an accident does not indicate [anything] but a this-in-this. Therefore, no expression for an accident is a true definition. Therefore, accidents do not have a definition in truth.

Subsequently [Aristotle] says that even if [accidents] do not have a definition absolutely speaking, nonetheless they have a definition in some way just as they have quiddity, since definition is said in many ways. For just as quid or quiddity is said in

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The following note, translated from Latin into English, is taken from the edition of Rufus’ In DGen (1.4.12, p. 134) by N. Lewis, R. Wood, & J. Ottman (Greek texts are added): “Aristotle used the locution hoc-in-hoc (τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ δὲ, ‘this-in-this’) in DAn 3.4.429b13-14: “For flesh is not without matter, but is a this-in-this as the snub” // “ἡ γὰρ σὰρξ οὐκ ἀνευ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ’ ὡσπερ τὸ σιμόν, τόδε ἐν τῷ δὲ (ed. Ross) // “caro enim non est sine materia, set est sicut simum hoc in hoc” (ed. R. Gauthier, p. 446). About this passage Averroes says (In DAn 3.9): “The cause on account of which a form is not grasped by the intellect except with matter, which makes the former grasp the latter in a different disposition, is that forms are not apart from matter. For the form of flesh is never stripped from matter, but it is always understood with matter, as snubbness with nose, since snubbness is some this in some this (aliquid hoc in aliquo hoc). And that is the case with sensible forms, namely, that they are some this in some this” (ed. F. Crawford, CCAA 6.1, p. 423). See also Rufus’ In DAn 3.3: “And since [Aristotle] already supposed that flesh does not differ according to its own essence and according to its own act of existence, here he shows this, namely because flesh, considered according to its own essence is not without natural matter and material conditions, the sort of which are mobility [and] contrariety, but is a this-in-this (hoc in hoc) as the snub” (M3313.81 vb). See also Aristotle’s Metaph. 7.5.1030b17-20.”
many ways—since it is said of substance primarily (primo modo) [and] of accidents secondarily—so too definition is said primarily of substance, [and] secondarily of accidents. Now, he proves that quid is said of accidents in the following way: just as we ask what (quid) man is, so too we ask what quantity is, and similarly in the case of other accidents. Therefore, accidents have definitions, not absolutely speaking but in the logical mode.

SMet 7.4.E3

[870-881] Subsequently [Aristotle] proves that accidents have quiddity just as they have entity. Therefore, he says that the expression for any thing must be as it pertains to the nature of the thing for which it is that expression. For this reason, to say that accidents do not have definitions or quiddities and that they are not entities (and [Aristotle] absolutely intends to deny it) is to say that accidents do not have what they must have, and such a statement is false. But someone who says absolutely that accidents have definitions and quiddities and that they are accidents says that they have what they do not have, and therefore such a statement is false. Therefore, someone who wants to speak about them must say that they have definitions in some way and quiddities in some way, and that they are entities in some way and not absolutely.

[882-895] Subsequently he distinguishes entity, saying that entity is said in many ways, yet not equivocally but analogically, since entity is said primarily of one nature, such as substance, and per posterius of other things, such as accidents, and this on account of some relation⁴ (attributio) they have to substance. Hence, that multiplicity is not

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⁴ The Latin word for ‘relation’ is attributio. The following passage from SMet 1.1.Q1 justifies this rendering:

“The first cause is something true, and caused things are true. Therefore, the name ‘true’ is said of caused things and of the first cause. Therefore, either it is predicated equivocally or univocally or [it is] multiply said. Not univocally, since nothing is said entirely univocally of the creator and of creatures. Not equivocally, since thusly there would be neither order nor arrangement or consecution between ‘true’ said of Him and ['true' said] of these things. In the same way, neither [would there be order or consecution between] ‘good’ [said of Him and ‘good’ said of these things], if it were said equivocally. But there is in fact order; therefore, etc. Therefore, it will be multiply said. But a name that is multiply said of many things applies first to one and it is subsequently assigned to others, namely, on account of certain relations of those things to it. And whenever such a name is predicated, the nature to which it is first assigned is predicated, but sometimes directly, sometimes obliquely.” // “Prima causa verum est et causata vera sunt. Hoc igitur nomen ‘verum’ dicitur de prima causa et de causatis. Aut ergo aequivoce praedicatur aut univoce aut est multiplicer dictum. Univoce non, quia nihil pure univoce dicitur de creator et creaturis. Aequivoce non, quia sic non est ordinatio nec convenientia inter verum dictum de Primo et de ipsis rebus; codem modo nec bonum, si aequivoce dicetur; nunc autem est ordinatio; ergo etc. Ergo multiplicer dicitur. Sed nomen multiplicer dictum de multis primo uni convenit et imponitur aliis consequenter, scilicet propter aliquas attributiones illorum ad ipsum. Et ubicunque tale nomen praedicatur, praedicatur illa natura cui primo imponitur, sed aliquando recte, aliquando oblique.”

Notice that in the following passage from SMet 2.9.Q2 attributio is used as a synonym of respectus (‘relation’, ‘respect’):

“If quantity is not equivocal, then it is purely univocal or analogical. Not univocal, since it is impossible to find something most general and purely univocal, since if so, it [would be possible] to find in quantity one
complete equivocation as the multiplicity of a name said of two opposites, as ‘not known’ is said of what is known and of what is unknown: sophistically of what is known, and truly of what is unknown. And similarly in the Arabic language there is some name that signifies opposites—for example, ‘tearum’ signifies light and darkness, and this equivocally. And similarly ‘healym’, which signifies great and small. However, such is not the multiplicity of entity, but it is analogical, like the multiplicity of the name ‘medicinal’, said of bodies, plants, actions, and instruments.

[896-902] And note the difference between an analogical name, [a name] said multiply, a name that is equivocal absolutely speaking, and one that is univocal absolutely speaking. And [the difference] is this: a name is univocal absolutely speaking when the word (vox) is one, and the nature or thing is one, and the account (ratio) or intention (intentio) corresponding to the thing is one. Now, a name is equivocal absolutely speaking when the word is one, [but] neither the thing nor the nature nor the intention or account corresponding to it is one.

[902-907] A name is analogical when the word is one, the account or intention is one, [and] the thing or nature to which the account answers is not one, such as ‘whole’ in continuous and discrete [quantities]. For the word [corresponding to] the name ‘whole’ is one [and the same] here and there, and similarly the account or intention, since ‘aggregate from parts’ is the account [of the name ‘whole’], but the thing or nature is entirely distinct, since unity is different from point, and number from magnitude.

[908-919] Now, a name is multiply said when the word is one, the thing or nature is also one, but the account or intention is not one, as the name ‘entity’. For there is one word and one nature, because [it is] substance, since entity is not predicated directly of nature with respect to number and line. If analogical, then it is said according to the prior and the posterior. Therefore, according to the rule of analogicals, it will be owed to one first, and then it will be applied to others per posterius, and it is not applied to them except on account of some relations or respects of those things to that to which it first applies. Of what, then, is the name ‘quantity’ first [said], of number or of continuum? // “Si quantitas non est aequivocum, aut igitur pure univocum aut analogum. Non univocum; impossibile enim est invenire generalissimum pure univocum, quia si sic, esset invenire in quantitate unam naturam respectu numeri et lineae. Si analogum, ergo secundum prius et posterius dictum. Ergo iuxta regulam analogorum uni primo debetur et alis per posterius erit accommodatum, et illis non accommodatur nisi propter alaquas attributiones sive respectus ipsorum ad ipsum cui primo convenit. Cuius est igitur hoc nomen ‘quantitas’ primo, aut numeri aut continui?”

Note also Donati (2013, p. 147): “Averroes describes pros hen equivocation as intermediate between pure homonymy and synonymy and characterized as sharing the same name by different things that are related in different ways to the same focus. […] The term that in the Latin translation of Averroes’s commentary and in the Arab-Latin translation of the Metaphysics is used to indicate the ontological dependence on the focus is the word attributio, which will become a terminus technicus in the medieval Latin theories of analogy.”

5 Metaph. 1003b5-16: “And similarly entity is also said in many ways, but all of these ways are related to one thing. For some things are called entities because they are substances, and some because they are passions, and some because they are accidents […] Therefore, just as the science of healthy things is one, so too the science of other similar things [is one]. For it pertains to a single science not only the consideration of the things that are said of one thing alone, but also the consideration of the things that are related to one nature. For these are said of one thing in some way. Therefore it is manifest that it pertains to a single science the consideration of entities in general.” // “Et similiter ens etiam dicitur multis modis, sed
anything else. Hence, Aristotle [says]: Accidents are not entities but belong to an entity. Hence, whenever we say entity we understand substance, either obliquely or directly. Now, the account of the name ‘entity’ is diverse, since what exists per se and what does not are called entity. However, it is evident that [entity] is no nature other than substance, since, if we leave aside every nature of substance (natura substantiae), an accident is nothing other than the being of substance. Hence, accident is not entity except insofar as entity is derived from being, and the Commentator says this explicitly.

SMet 7.4.E4

[920-923] Subsequently he recapitulates, saying that definition and quiddity will belong absolutely and in the first mode to substances, in the second and per posterius to accidents, since accidents can be signified by one name and thus they have a definition in some way.

[924-931] Subsequently he says that the aggregate of substance and accident is not one in the truest way, and yet in some way they are one and more truly one than the things that are one by a tie or by conjunction, as the Iliad is one by conjunction, since [one] sentence is connected to [another] sentence. For the things that are one in that way, by a tie, do not have definitions. But accidents have definitions in some way, and similarly an aggregate of substance and accident such as ‘pale man’.

SMet 7.4.Q2

[969-971] Subsequently let us ask what it means to say “accidents do not have definitions except in a logical way” and also “accidents have definitions in one way and not in another”.

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*omnes illi modi attribuuntur uni rei; quaedam enim dicuntur entia quia sunt substantiae, et quaedam quia sunt passiones, et quaedam quia sunt accidentia […]. Quemadmodum igitur scientia sanorum est una, sicut scientia aliorum similium; non enim est unius scientiae consideratio de rebus quae dicuntur de uno tantum, sed etiam consideratio de rebus quae attribuuntur uni naturae. Ista enim dicuntur de uno quomodo. Manifestum est igitur quod unius scientiae est consideratio de entibus universaliter" (Arabica-Latina). // “οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχ ῶς µὲν ἀλλ' ἅπαν πρὸς µίαν ἀρχήν· τὰ µὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ' ὅτι πάθη οὐσίας […]. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ἰσχυόν ἀπάντων μία ἑπιστήµη ἔστιν, ὁµοίως τὸ ὄν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οὐ γὰρ µόνον τὸν καθ' ἐν λεγοµένων ἑπιστήµης ἐστὶ θεωρήσαί µιᾶς ἄλλη καὶ τῶν πρὸς µίαν λεγοµένων φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τρόπον τινὰ λέγονται καθ' ἐν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ τὰ ὄντα µιᾶς θεωρήσει ἄντα” (ed. Ross).

*Metaph. 1028a18: “And other things are called entities because they belong to an entity.” // “et alia dicuntur entia quia sunt entis” (Arabica-Latina). // “τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ ὄντος ὄντος” (ed. Ross).

For the translation of the genitive as ‘belong(s) to’ see note 1 above.

Rufus follows Averroes in often preferring the term ‘aggregate’ (aggregatum) to ‘composite’ (compositum). In this respect, he does not seem to be following the practice of Averroes’ Latin translator who prefers congregatum (Metaph. 7.26, 27, 35 & 37; DAn 2.7 & 3.5, but also uses compositum at Metaph. 7.23, 8.16, & 10.23).
[972-975] Subsequently let us ask, if an accident has the most general genus, whether it has a differentia in its definition that is also an accident of the same category, or whether it does not [have one], but only a substance instead of a differentia.

[976] And it seems that it has:

[977-990] For if the most general genus has divisive and essential differentiae, which are accidents, let us therefore take this most general genus and one of its differentiae, and we will have a definition of some species, which is an accident. And let us take another differentia with that genus, and there will be a definition of another accident. And in this way the accident can be defined from the genus that is an accident and the differentia that is an accident. And we find in Boethius⁹ that there is a true definition from genus and differentia; for a true definition is based on two terms alone. And therefore a substance need not appear in the definition of an accident. For if a substance were added in the definition of an accident, the definition would be superfluous. Proof: the aggregate of genus and differentia was convertible with the defined accident. Therefore, what was added to that aggregate was superfluous. Therefore, the substance added in the definition of the accident is superfluous.

[991-996] And to this someone can reply as follows: suppose that \( A \) is the most general genus, \( B \) and \( C \) the divisive differentiae of that genus, \( D \) the proximate accident under \( A \). In the definition of that which is \( D \) we find only \( A \) and \( B \), and \( A \) is the most general genus, and \( B \) is the differentia that is an accident. Hence, a substance does not appear here. Nonetheless, in the definition of another accident under \( A \) a substance appears.

[997] But on the contrary [we can argue] in the following way:

[998-1013] The accident, in whose definition the substance that is under \( A \) is posited, is either opposed as an opposed species to \( D \) or not. If so, then its definition will be constituted from the genus \( A \) and the differentia \( C \), which is opposed to the differentia that is \( B \). Therefore, just as it is not necessary to posit a substance in the definition of \( D \), so too it is unnecessary to posit it in the definition of that accident. But if that accident is under \( D \), it is still unnecessary to posit a substance in its definition. For just as \( A \) had divisive differentiae, so also \( D \), which is the middle genus, will have divisive differentiae, and similarly species opposite to \( D \). Therefore, that accident is either definable under \( D \) or under the species opposite to it. If immediately under \( D \), then from \( D \) and from one of its divisive differentiae there will be a definition of that accident. Therefore, [it is unnecessary] to posit a substance in its definition. We must argue in a similar way if that accident were posited under the species opposite to \( D \) as under the proximate genus. And even if that reply were good, there would be no substance in the definition of any accident.

[1014-1019] And if someone were to say that the most general genus, which is an accident, does not have under it essential differentiae that are accidents but substances, then that genus will be divided first into two substances. Therefore, [one] species under it

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⁹ *In Topica Ciceronis* 3.
will be aggregated from that genus and a substance, and the species opposite to it will be an aggregate of that genus and another substance, and so on for every species under that genus.

[1020] But on the contrary:

[1021-1026] From this it seems that no species under that genus is an accident or a substance. Proof: a definition is based on things essential to what is defined. Therefore, since that species is defined by a substance as its differentia, there will be a substance essential to it. But no substance is essential to an accident. Therefore, this will not be an accident. It will not be a substance either, on account of the genus posited in its definition, which is an accident.

[1027-1033] We must reply to this that this genus has essential differentiae that are accidents, and that in the definition of the accident a genus, a differentia which is an accident, and also a substance are posited, since we cannot know what an accident is except through a substance. For it is the same to know what (quid) an accident is and why (propter quid) it is. And since we cannot know the propter quid of an accident except through a substance, we cannot know the quid of an accident except through a substance.

[1034-1037] But this reasoning is false, for if the definition of an accident is true apart from a substance, as has already been proved, it makes us know what it is. Therefore, the definition of an accident from a genus and a differentia that is an accident, since it is true, makes us know what the accident is.

[1038-1042] Next, if the definition is true, the things that are posited in the definition are predicated of [the accident] quidditatively. Therefore, they make us know what it is. And if it is the same to know what [something] is and why it is in the case of accidents, the definition from a genus and a differentia that is an accident makes us know why it is, without assuming a substance in it.

[1043-1055] Next, if accidents are defined by means of substance, contraries will have entirely the same definition. Proof: take some contraries, A and B, in some genus. They have the same genus since they are contraries. But “contraries are designed (nata sunt) to be produced in the same subject,”10 and they are contraries in the same matter and in the same potential. Therefore, A and B have the same subject. Therefore, let us define A; a substance must appear in its definition, but not a substance other than its subject. Therefore, the definition of A will be from the genus and its subject. Similarly, let us define B, and it will have the same genus in its definition, since it does not have another genus, and the same subject, since that subject is common to both. Therefore, the definition of A will be entirely the same as the definition of B. Therefore, etc.

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10 Aristotle, De somno 453b27-29: “For contraries, in natural and other things, are always seen to be received in the same [subject], and to be passions of the same [subject].” // “nam extrema semper in alii et in naturalibus circa idem susceptibile videntur fieri et eiusdem esse passiones” (trans. uetus). // “ἀεὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δικτυκῷ φαίνεται γιγνόμενα, καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντα πάθη […]” (ed. Ross).
In reply to the first of these arguments we must say that the logician, considering accidents and being and entity, first posits that being is essence (ponit esse esse essentiam primo), and that entity is derived from being, and he posits that this entity has quiddity and definition. And thus, since accidents are entities derived from being, accidents have quiddity and entity in the logical mode, i.e. as the logician derives entity from being. But the philosopher, considering the truth of things, posits first entity and being derived from [entity] (ponit ens primum et esse derivatum ab eo). Hence, since an accident is an entity derived from being, he does not posit an accident as an entity but as [something that] belongs to an entity. And thus, according to him, an accident has neither quiddity nor definition, and accidents also lack a genus. For their quiddity is caused by substance, since if we leave aside the nature of substance, an accident has only being. Hence, the quiddity of a substance and the quiddity of an accident are not one quiddity and another. Therefore, they lack a genus, since they lack proper quiddity. However, they have differentiae more properly than genus, since from their own nature they have being and quale, which signifies differentia. But they do not have quiddity except from other things, and thus they do not truly have a genus.

Notice that a material form, which is a substance, is first a nature and something in itself, and per posterius the act of matter and something inhering in it. But an accidental form is first the being of matter, and from that [form], existing as being, the logician fabricates (format) the quiddity and nature in it.

In reply to the other argument we must say that in the definition of any accident a substance appears. Since although in the definition of an accident a substance is not expressed sometimes, but we take only a genus and a differentia that is an accident, nonetheless a substance is understood in that definition from our understanding of the genus and the differentia. For no accident is removed from the signification of substance, and therefore no accident is defined apart from substance.

And if someone were to say that there is negation in such a definition, since a substance appears twice, once from the understanding of the genus and again from the understanding of the differentia, we must say that if the genus appeared per se, a substance would be understood in it; and similarly if the differentia appeared per se. But if they were joined to one another and united, since the genus is potential and the differentia is extracted from it, and a single act of understanding is produced by the two

11 ‘First entity’ (ens primum) is substance, as it appears in Aristotle’s Metaph. 1028a14-16: “And since entity is said in many ways, it is evident that the first entity among them is that which signifies quid, and this is what signifies substance.” // “Et cum ens dicitur multis modis, manifestum est quod primum ens istorum est illud quod significat quid, et hoc est illud quod significat substantiam” (Arabica-Latina). // “τοσαυταχῶς δ ὲ λεγοµένου το ῦ ὄ ντος φανερόν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὄν το τί ἔστιν, ἀπερ σηµαινει την οὐσίαν” (ed. Ross). Alternatively, primum in Rufus’ passage may be taken as an adverb (parallel to primo in the first clause of this paragraph): “But the philosopher, considering the truth of things, first posits entity and being derived from [entity].”
12 For the translation of the Latin genitive as ‘belong(s) to’ see note 1 above.
13 Propria quiditas can be alternatively translated as ‘quiddity of their own’.
14 ‘Act of understanding’ translates intellectus.
united, the substance is understood only once. Therefore, we must say that in the
definition of an accident a substance is understood—I mean, of an accident that is a
species. But if we were to describe the most general genus and its principles, in their
definitions a substance will appear explicitly, either under the name ‘substance’ or under
a more specific name such as ‘matter’. And this is manifestly evident to someone who
knows what is the cause of quantity and its principles, which is manifest from the
preceding [discussion].

SMet 7.5.Q1

[1297-1299] Let us ask here, since [Aristotle] says that the aggregate from substance and
accident cannot be defined, whether ‘rational animal’ can be defined.

[1300] And it seems it cannot:

[1301-1306] For, if so, then its definition would be obtained from the definition of the
genus and from the definition of the differentia. Therefore, since in the definition of the
differentia the genus occurs (namely, animal), the same thing would be included twice in
the definition (namely, [in the definition] of animal). And that the genus appears in the
definition of the differentia is evident in the following way: the genus is indeed present in
the understanding of the differentia, just as the subject is present in the understanding of
the passion; that is, in potential.

[1307-1313] In reply to this we must say that the aggregate ‘rational animal’ can be
defined. And there will be no nugation, since in the description of the differentia the
genus does not occur. And the reason is this, that the differentia is not an accident with
respect to the genus, but rather its completive form (forma completiva ipsius). Hence,
even if the subject appears in the definition of the passion, nonetheless the genus does not
appear in the description of the differentia; and this because a passion is an accidental
differentia with respect to the subject, but the differentia is essential with respect to the
genus.

SMet 7.5.Q2

[1314-1315] Subsequently let someone ask whether there is nugation in ‘animal man’.

[1316-1324] And someone will say that there is not, but that there is nugation in ‘man
animal’. And he sets this as a rule: When in the first [term] the second is understood, then
there is nugation. But when in the second the first is understood, there is no nugation.
Hence, ‘animal man’ is not nugation, just as ‘double of half’ and ‘nose [which is] snub’.15
And this is because just as ‘double’ is understood in ‘half”—and when we say ‘double of
half’, [‘double’] is understood again in [‘half’]—so too ‘animal’ is understood in ‘man’
taken per se, but when we say ‘animal man’, [‘animal’] is not understood again in
[‘man’], and in this way there will be no nugation.

15 The argument presented here states that nugation depends on the order of terms, so it is important to
retain the Latin word order (nasus simus).
On the contrary [we can argue] in the following way: if this is true, then there will be no nugation in ‘man animal’, since in the aforementioned opinion ‘man’ stands for the differentia alone.

Next, if the definition of snub is ‘snub nose’, according to Aristotle there will be nugation here, because snub will be a species of nose, and nose will be actually present in the understanding of snub. Therefore, if I say ‘animal man’, since man is a species of animal, there will be nugation here, because animal is present in actuality in the understanding of man.

Next, Aristotle says in Topics VI: If, having stated the universal, someone adds the particular, namely the one under the genus (for he does not mean the differentia), he says the same thing twice. Therefore, when we say ‘animal man’, there will be nugation here according to Aristotle.

Next, when I say ‘animal man’, let us put the account instead of the name; but in the definition of man animal occurs. Therefore, it is the same to say ‘animal man’ as ‘animal animal rational’, and there is nugation here.

And if someone were to say that, when we say ‘animal man’, animal is no longer understood in ‘man’, it follows that he concedes that ‘man’ is similarly related to ‘animal’ just as ‘snub’ to ‘nose’.

Next to this someone can reply in a different way that, when I say ‘animal animal rational’, I can say this in two ways: in one way: ‘animal, animal rational’, and thus there is no nugation; in another way: ‘animal animal, rational’.

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16 Arist., Top. 141a15-22: “Again, see if a universal has been mentioned and then a particular case of it added as well, e.g. equity is a remission of what is expedient and just; for what is just is a branch of what is expedient and is therefore included in the latter: it is therefore redundant, an addition of the particular after the universal has been already stated. So also, if he defines medicine as knowledge of what makes for health in animals and men, or the law as the image of what is by nature noble and just; for what is just is a branch of what is noble, so that he says the same thing more than once” (ORT). // “Rursum si universali dicto addidit et particulare, ut si clementiam diminutionem expeditium et iustorum; nam iustum expediens quid, quare continetur in expeditum. Habundans ergo iustum, nam qui dixit universale addidit et particulare. Et si medicinam disciplinam sanativorum animali et homini, aut legem imaginem eorum quae naturaliter sunt bona et iusta; nam iustum bonum quid, quare frequenter idem dicit” (trans. Boethius). // “Πάλιν εἰ τοῦ καθόλου εἰρημένου προσθείη καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, οὖν εἰ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν ἐλάττωσιν τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ δικαίων· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον συμφέρον τι, ὥστε περιέχεται ἐν τῷ συμφέροντι. περιττὸν οὖν τὸ δίκαιον· καθόλου γὰρ ἐπάνω ἐπὶ μέρους προσθήκην. καὶ εἰ τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐπιστήμην τῶν ὑγιεινῶν ζῴῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ τὸν νόμον εἰκόνα τῶν φύσεως καὶ δικαίων· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον καλὸν τι, ὥστε πλεονάκις τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει” (ed. Ross).

17 In Latin “animal animal rationale”. The account (ratio) of man is ‘animal rationale’, which is ‘rational animal’ in the standard English word order.

18 The Latin text uses the same expression (‘animal animal rationale’), which according to the objector can be said in two ways. The commas have been added with the aim of clarifying what seems to be the intended distinction, although the Latin word order has been retained. According to the objector, ‘animal, animal rationale’ would not be a case of nugation, since in this way the expression means ‘animal, rational animal’ in the English word order. Here the expression after the comma is merely epexegetic, so it is not a genuine
But on the contrary: by the aggregate ‘animal rational’ we understand
animal in actuality, and it is understood once by itself. Therefore, it is understood twice.

Next, just as it is not possible to separate ‘animal man’, so too it is not
possible to separate ‘animal animal rational’.

From this it is evident the general rule about nugation, namely, that when
some two things are joined to one another, either one is actually present in the
understanding of the other or not. If so, in whatever way [the terms] are ordered there will
be nugation. If not, there will be no nugation. Hence, there is no nugation in ‘I read’,
because ‘I’ is not actually present in the understanding of the verb ‘to read’. And since
the genus is actually present in the understanding of the species and cannot be separated
from it in understanding, but rather it is part of its signification, for this reason there is
nugation whenever a genus and its species are joined together. And since double is not in
the primary signification of half, for this reason there is no nugation if I were to say
‘double of half’.

And notice that an accident is considered in two ways: either as a subject or
as a passion. If [it is considered] as a subject, then a substance is understood in its
definition and does not appear [in it], and such a definition will be a principle external to
the demonstration, and in this way accidents are defined insofar as they are species. If
[an accident is considered] as a passion, then its definition will be the definition that is

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case of nugation. On the contrary, according to the objector, ‘animal animal, rationale’ (‘animal animal, rational’ or ‘rational animal’ in the English word order) is a genuine case of nugation.

Rufus’ passage seems to be based on Aristotle’s APo 2.10. The following is an excerpt from Kilwardby’s commentary to APo 2.10, which clarifies the sense of Rufus’ expression: “Diffinitio enim subiecti dicitur principium quia extra est supposita ante demonstrationem et non est de contextu demonstrationis ipsius passionis. Diffinitio autem passionis dicens quid est et propter quid potest dici principium demonstrationis intrinsecum. Ingreditur enim demonstrationem et est medium” (Notule Libri Posteriorum 2.12, 198-201, ed. Cannone). // “For the definition of the subject is called a principle since it is assumed outside, prior to the demonstration, and not in the structure of the demonstration of the passion. However, the definition of the passion that states what it is and why can be called an intrinsic principle of the demonstration, since it enters the demonstration and is the middle [term].” See also Albert the Great: “Ratio autem una, hoc est, altera de re ipsa data, est duplex, secundum quod duplex est unum; est enim unum ordine et connexione multorum: unde sicut unum dicitur Ilias, hoc est, versus Homeri de historia Trojana, quae connexio est multorum, et ordine unum: et haec unitas vocatur conjunctio multorum ad invicem; et haec similis est ratio subjecti, quae datur ex genere et differentiis, ad unum ultimum complementum ordidinata per modum ordinis quo potentiae plures ordinantur ad actum unum: et haec est diffinitio quae extra stat et non ingreditur demonstrationem [...] et est principium demonstrationis extrinsecum” (Albert the Great, In APo 2.11, ed. Borgnet, OO 2: 194). // “But one account, i.e. the one given of the thing itself, is twofold (duplex), insofar as what is twofold is one, since it is one by the ordering and connection of many things: hence, it is said to be one just as the Iliad (i.e. Homer’s poem about the story of Troy), which is the connection of many and one in ordering, and this unity is called conjunction of many things to one another. And the account of the subject is similar to this, which is given from the genus and the differentiae, ordered into a single last complement through the mode of ordering by which many potentialities are ordered into a single actuality. And this is the definition that stands outside and does not enter the demonstration […] and it is an extrinsic principle of demonstration.”
the demonstration differing in position, and in such a definition it is necessary that the subject or substance, the cause of the accident, and the accident appear.

_SMet 7.5.Q3_

[1369-1376] But now it seems as follows that the aggregate ‘concave nose’ cannot be defined: just as snubness is related to concavity, [so too] the proper subject of snubness [is related] to the proper subject of concavity. But concavity is actually present in the understanding of snubness; therefore, the proper subject of concavity will be actually present in the understanding of snubness. Therefore it is not possible to define the aggregate ‘concave nose’ without nugation, since the subject of concavity appears once when I say ‘nose’ and again in the definition of concave.

[1377-1383] In reply to this we must say that the proper subject of concavity is surface, but the proper subject of snubness is nose; while surface is not actually present in the understanding of nose. Hence, concavity is not related to snubness in just the way as their subjects are related. However, the similitude is in the fact that just as concavity and snubness are _per se_ accidents of some subjects, so too nose and surface are proper subjects with respect to some accidents, such as these ones.

_SMet 7.5.Q4_

[1384] But we can still ask about nugation.

[1385-1413] For it seems that nugation follows from the existence of the definition of an accident that consists of a genus and a differentia of its own category, in the following way: let _A_ be the accident that must be defined; Let _B_ be its genus included in its definition; [Let] _C_ [be] the differentia. The definition of _A_ consists of _B_ and _C_. But _B_ is an accident; therefore it can be defined. But in the definition of any accident, according to Aristotle, a subject appears. Then, in the definition of _B_ its subject will appear; similarly, in the definition of _C_ its subject will appear. But _B_ is present in the understanding of _C_, since the genus is present in the understanding of the differentia either actually or potentially. Then, the subject of _B_ will be present in the understanding of the subject of _C_ either actually or potentially. But not potentially; proof: the subject of _B_ is a substance, and similarly the subject of _C_. Let this be posited, for it is possible from the fact that each one is an accident. But since their subjects are substances, they are either opposite species or not. If they are, then neither is present in the understanding of the other, neither actually nor potentially, the opposite of which has already been proved. If they are not, then one of them will be the genus and the other the species; therefore, one is actually

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20 In _APo_ 2.10.94a1-2 Aristotle says that one sort of definition (ὅρος) is “a demonstration of what something is, differing in position from the demonstration” // “ἀπόδειξις τοῦ τί ἐστι, τῇ θέσει διαφέρον τῆς ἀποδεικτικῇ (ed. Ross) // “demonstratio eius quod quid est, positione differens a demonstratione” (trans. Iac. Ven.).
present in the understanding of the other. But it has already been proved that the subject of $B$ is present in the understanding of the subject of $C$; therefore, it will be actually present in its understanding. Then, let us define $B$; in its definition its subject is included. Let us define $C$; in its definition its proper subject is included, and similarly the subject of $B$, since it is actually present in the understanding of the subject of $C$. Therefore, the subject of $B$ appears in its definition and in the definition of $C$. Since therefore the definition of the accident is composed of $B$ and $C$, the same thing appears twice in the definition, namely the subject of $B$, since [it appears] once through $B$ itself, and again through $C$ itself. Therefore, there will be nugation here. And if there is nugation here, then nugation follows from every formal definition (definitio secundum speciem facta) of an accident.

[1414-1426] In reply to this we must say that an accident can be well defined from a genus and a differentia of its own category, and yet there will be no nugation in that definition, since the subjects of these accidents, although they are substances, nonetheless they are not directly opposite species, nor is one a genus in relation to the other, but one is related to the other as what is prior is related to what is subsequent. But in what is subsequent we understand what is prior, not actually but potentially, just as in the sensitive [faculty] we understand the vegetative potentially. Therefore, the subject of $B$ is present in the understanding of the subject of $C$ only in potency, as the genus is present in the understanding of the differentia. And therefore there is no nugation in the definition of the accident, which consists of a genus and a differentia of its own category. But if the subject of the genus were actually present in the understanding of the subject of the differentia, then there would be nugation.

SMet 7.5.Q5

[1427-1428] Subsequently let us inquire about Aristotle’s statement that all dialectical definitions are worthless. 21

[1429-1436] For it seems that he contradicts himself in this chapter, since he says that the true definition of an accident is that in which a substance appears. But the dialectician defines substance by means of a genus and a differentia of its own category. But by a genus that is an accident we understand a substance, and similarly by a differentia, from the fact that each one is an accident. Therefore, in the definition of an accident made by

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21 *DAn* 402b25-403a2: “For what a thing is (quod quid est, τὸ τί ἐστιν) is a principle of every demonstration, so that, for those definitions which do not enable us to know the accidents nor even make it easy to conjecture about them, it is evident that they have all been stated dialectically and worthlessly (κενῶς)” // “πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως ἀρχῆ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὅστε καθ’ ὅσους τῶν ὁρισμῶν μὴ συμβάινει τὰ συμβεβηκότα γνωρίζειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὔμαρξες, δῆλον ὅτι διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηται καὶ κενῶς ἁπαντές” (ed. Ross) // “Omnis enim demonstrationis principium est quod quid est; quare, secundum quascumque diffinitionum non contingit accidentia cognoscere, sed neque coniectari de ipsis facile, manifestum est quod dialectice dicantur et vane omnes” (trans. Iac. Ven.). The adverb κενῶς is usually rendered as ‘in vain’ (vane in Latin).
the dialectician a substance appears. Therefore, he defines truly according to Aristotle, and so his definition is not worthless.

[1437-1444] In reply to this we must say that in the dialectician’s definition concerning an accident a substance appears, just as in the definition of the philosopher. However, the dialectician does not include in his definition that there is a substance, but only a genus and a differentia, each of which is an accident, and for this reason his definition is worthless. But the philosopher includes in his definition, which he constructs about an accident, that there is a substance. For he knows well that the name of the accident is not removed from the signification of a substance, and for this reason he defines correctly

**SMet 7.5.Q6**

[1445-1446] 7.5.Q6A Subsequently we can inquire into [Aristotle’s] statement that accidents do not have true definitions.

[1447] For this seems to be false for this reason:

[1448-1451] There are true demonstrations about accidents. But demonstrations are based on true causes; but the cause and the definition are the same; therefore, since accidents have true causes, from the fact that they have true demonstrations, [it follows] necessarily that they have true definitions.

[1452-1463] Next, an accident is defined in two ways: in one way, by a formal definition and [in another way] by a definition in which the subject is posited. And the definition in which the subject is posited makes [us] know its cause; therefore, this definition is truer. Therefore, if some definition of [the accident] must be the middle [term] in the demonstration, it will be this; but this cannot be the middle [term]; therefore, no [definition will be the middle term in a demonstration]. That this [definition] cannot [be the middle term] is manifest from Aristotle’s statement: a material definition (definitio secundum materiam facta) has a middle [term] by which it is demonstrated, but a formal definition does not. 23 Therefore this [definition], as it seems, should conclude a

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22 The Latin word *terminus* is often elided in this question. When it appears, it may mean (logical) ‘term’ or (linguistic) ‘expression’. An example of the former meaning in this lecture is *SMet* 7.5.Q6A: “However, the definition of an accident which is a demonstration differing in position cannot be the middle [term], since it contains all three terms in itself—namely the cause, the passion, and the subject” // “Definitio autem accidentis quae est demonstratio positione differens non potest esse medium; ipsa enim continet omnes tres terminos in se—scilicet causam, passionem et subiectum.” But the word *terminus* stands for ‘expression’ in *SMet* 7.5.Q6, ad 7.5.Q6C: “And the first expression in that middle [term] will be the genus of this passion and will be concrete.” // “Et primus terminus in illo medio erit genus illius passionis et erit in concretione.”

23 The following note, translated from Latin into English, is taken from Wood et al.’s unpublished edition of the *SMet*: “More likely a gloss introduced by mistake of the scribes, as Aquinas says (In *APo* 2.8.3); but in Iacobus’ translation after *APo* 2.9.93b21 it says: “Diffinitiones quidem secundum speciem factae nullum habent medium quo demonstrantur, sed diffinitiones secundum materiam factae possunt habere medium” (AL 4.1: 83). Cf. Grosseteste, *Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum* 2.2, ed. P. Rossi, pp. 335-340"
demonstration and not be the middle [term]. Moreover, the formal definition must be the middle [term] if any [definition] is [the middle term]; but it cannot be, since it does not state the cause. Therefore, neither can be the middle [term].

[1464-1478] Next, an accident is defined either by a material definition, or by a formal definition, or by a definition that is the demonstration differing in position.24 However, the definition of an accident which is a demonstration differing in position cannot be the middle [term], since it contains all three terms in itself—namely the cause, the passion, and the subject. But the material definition of an accident cannot be the middle [term]; for if it were the middle [term], since there is a subject in it, the subject would be the middle [term] or a part of the middle [term]; therefore, the minor extreme would be the middle [term] or a part of the middle [term]. Moreover, the formal definition cannot be the middle term, since it does not contain the cause. Therefore, no definition of an accident will be the middle [term] in a demonstration. And if so, then the middle [term] in a demonstration is not the definition of the major extreme since that is always the passion. This contradicts Aristotle, since he says that the middle [term] is the definition of the first term and sometimes the definition of the last.

[1479-1492] 7.5.Q6B But now it seems that the middle [term] in a demonstration is not the definition of the minor extreme, since, if it were, the major proposition in the demonstration would always be false and also the conclusion. Proof: the minor extreme is something abstract, since the subject of the passion is not something concrete. Therefore its definition, which is predicated of it quidditatively, will be abstract. But the definition of the subject in abstraction is neither the passion itself nor the subject itself. Therefore, the major proposition is false and also the conclusion.

[1487-1492] To this someone can reply in the following way: if the passion that is the major extreme were abstract as it is posited in the demonstration, then the major proposition would be false, and similarly the conclusion. But it is not so, since it is concrete and, existing in this way, it can be demonstrated of the subject, and the major proposition will be true and also the conclusion.

[1493-1499] But this person assumes something false, since he assumes that the middle [term] in a demonstration is the definition of the subject, which is not true. Proof: the middle [term] in a demonstration, according to Aristotle, is the definition of the major extreme.25 But the major extreme according to the person that replies in this way is something concrete; therefore, this definition will not be an abstract nature. But the minor extreme is an abstract nature. Therefore, this will not be its definition.

[1500-1501] And suppose someone were to say that the definition that is the middle [term] can be the material definition of the subject.

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24 See note 21 above.
[1502-1516] On the contrary [we can argue] in the following way: if the middle [term] in the demonstration is the definition of the major extreme, it will be its material definition, since only this states the cause. And this is the same as the material definition with respect to the minor extreme, since this has already been posited. Therefore, this definition is each extreme’s definition within the same kind of definition. Therefore, the things defined will be the same absolutely speaking, which is false. Therefore, the middle [term] in the demonstration is not the material definition of the subject.

[1509-1517] 7.5.Q6C Subsequently let us ask: what mode of being per se is in the minor proposition? If the first mode, then the middle [term] will be the definition of the minor extreme, something which has already been disproved. But it seems that the first mode is in the minor proposition, since all those who speak prudently about demonstration say that the middle [term] in the demonstration is the material definition of the major extreme and the formal [definition] of the minor, since in it are the formal principles of the subject, which are the matter that is the necessity of the passion. Therefore, the first mode will be in the minor and the second in the major.

[1518] But on the contrary:

[1519-1525] Although this is true when a substance is the minor extreme, nonetheless it is not true when an accident is the minor extreme. And this happens very often so as to make a demonstration of an accident. For if a triangle is the subject in a demonstration, its formal definition cannot be the middle [term] demonstrating of it [sc. the triangle] that it has three angles (habitum trium angulorum), nor the material definition of the major extreme, since a substance appears in it.

[Solutions]

[1527-1532] In reply to the first question [7.5.Q6A] we must say that the cause and the definition are the same secundum rem, but differ in account. However, a demonstration absolutely speaking demands a cause absolutely speaking and as the account of the cause requires, but not a definition absolutely speaking. Hence, accidents can be demonstrated since they have a cause absolutely speaking, although they do not have a definition absolutely speaking, as the account of definition requires.

[1533-1552] And we must say [in reply to 7.5.Q6B] that only the material definition of an accident is the middle term in the most powerful demonstration; but the formal definition absolutely speaking of the minor extreme can be the middle [term]. Hence, we must understand that the material definition is either of the substance or of the accident. If [it is] of the substance, it can be demonstrated and have a middle [term] by which it is

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26 ‘The matter that is the necessity of the passion’ (materia quae est necessitas passionis) means ‘the matter in proximate potential to receive the passion’. This interpretation is supported by SMet 9.2.Q2 (reply to 9.1.Q1A).
demonstrated, since through the formal definition of the subject we can demonstrate its material definition. However, the material definition of the accident can be demonstrated, this is, it can be elicited from the demonstration, for it is manifest from the demonstration since it is the middle [term] of the demonstration. Seeing that it [sc. the material definition] is the cause of the passion, it follows that it is a definition, since it is the same to know what [something] is and why it is. But the formal definition of the passion cannot be demonstrated of the passion itself, but nonetheless it can be demonstrated of the subject of the passion, as [can] the passion itself. Moreover, the formal definition of the subject cannot be demonstrated by a demonstration [showing] why [something is], but it can be demonstrated by a demonstration [showing] that [something is].

[1553-1557] In reply to the other [contrary] argument we must say that the material definition of the accident is twofold: either that in which the subject term itself appears, or that in which the definition of the subject appears. But the material definition of the accident that is the middle [term] is the one in which the definition of the subject appears, and not the one in which the subject term itself appears.

[1558-1569] In reply to the other [question (7.5.Q6C)] we must say that in a demonstrative syllogism absolutely speaking, where all the terms are in the nominative case, the subject must be something abstract (such as a line), and the passion or major extreme something concrete. But the middle [term] must be the material definition of the accident, not in that the whole middle [term] is the matter of the passion, but [in that] some [part] of the middle [term] is. And the first expression (terminus) in that middle [term] will be the genus of this passion and will be concrete; but the things that follow the first expression in the middle [term] will be the matter that is the necessity of the passion.

[1570-1577] And if someone were to say that there will be nugation in the middle term on this basis [and] that, since all terms will be in the nominative case, there will be a middle [term] such as snub nose—and there is nugation here—, in reply to this we must say that all terms must be in the nominative case and yet there is no nugation, since the subject does not appear there. And where there is nugation in the definition of the accident, the subject must be the genus in that definition and some accident the essential differentia. But this is not so here, and therefore there is no nugation.

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27 The distinction between a demonstratio propter quid (a demonstration showing why something is) and a demonstratio quia (a demonstration showing that something is) appears in APo 2.10. In the Latin translation of APo 2.10 (lac. Ven.), quia est corresponds to the Greek ὅτι ἔστι, and propter quid est corresponds to διὰ τί ἔστιν (e.g. in 93b32).

28 See note 27 above.
[1578-1582] From this it is evident which mode [of] per se applies to the first proposition (namely, the second), and which mode applies to the second proposition (namely, the first and also the third); moreover, the fourth mode [applies] to the conclusion, if the cause by which the predicate is said of the subject is reduplicated in addition to the predicate of the conclusion.

SMet 7.13.Q1

[3163-3172] We can still ask more about what Aristotle says, that the parts of a true definition29 “are parts of the form and not of matter.”30

From this statement it seems that the defined substance is form alone. This also appears from Aristotle’s own saying that “a definition pertains to the whole and to form”31, and from what he says: “there are no parts of form and of what has a definition”32. By these statements, as it seems, he wants to indicate that the aggregate does not have a definition. Nor does matter; this is evident per se. Therefore, definition will only pertain to form.

[3173] On the contrary:

[A] In the eighth book of the *Metaphysics* he says that simple substances are not defined, but that only a composite substance is defined, and therefore a definition pertains to it. Then, if a definition states the whole quiddity of a thing, since it is the composite substance that is defined, the parts of its definition will not only be the parts of its form.

[B] Next, the thing defined is an aggregate, as the Commentator says,33 and therefore the parts of the definition will be the parts of the aggregate. Therefore, if a part of the aggregate is matter, a part of the definition will be matter.

[C] Next, a definition produces true knowledge of the thing defined. But the thing defined cannot truly be known unless its principles are known. It is therefore necessary to include the principles of the thing defined in the definition. But matter is one principle of the thing defined. Therefore, its matter must enter the definition so that the thing defined can be truly cognized.

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29 *Partes verae definitionis* may be alternatively rendered as ‘the true parts of a definition’.
30 Rufus’ quote is “sunt partes formae et non materiae” // “are parts of the form and not of matter”, whereas the *Arabica-Latina* reads: “litterae enim sunt partes formae, et non sunt materia” (Metaph. 1035a11) // “for letters are parts of the form, and they are not the matter”) // “τὰ µὲ ν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ οὐχ ὑλή” (ed. Ross).
32 *Metaph.* 1035a21: “They are neither parts of the form nor of that which has the definition.” // “formae […] et illius quod habet definitionem non sunt partes” (Arabica-Latina) // “τοῦ µὲν συνόλου µέρη, τοῦ εἴδους δὲ καὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος οὐκέτι.”
33 Averroes, *In Metaph.* 7.12 (ed. Iunt. 1562, 8: 162va): “And [Aristotle] said this because for composite substances it is manifest that they have definitions and names equal to their definitions.”
[3187-3189] [D] Next, a definition must the same as the thing defined. But a definition would not be the same as the thing defined unless matter were part of the definition; therefore, etc.

[3190-3209] In reply to the questions we must first address the last [7.13.Q1D] in the following way: A definition is in one way the same as the thing defined, and in another way it is not. For a definition is not the same as the thing defined as an entity in act is the same as an entity in act. For an entity in act cannot be predicated of an entity in act by a true predication; but a definition is truly predicated of the thing defined. Hence, for the definition to be the same as the thing defined is for the definition to be identified with the thing defined only through predication; and that is as an essential predicate inheres in a subject with respect to which it is essential, not as an entity inheres in an entity, but as a being (esse) inheres in an entity; for a predicate is not an entity but a being. Hence, the predicate is the same as the subject entity, as being is the same as entity, and as a definition is the same as the thing defined. For a definition is being with respect to the thing defined. And the Commentator agrees with this when he says that the definition is the same as the thing defined only by predication, not the same in such a way that the definition (which is the form) is the thing defined (which is something that has form).  

And through this last point he suggests that the thing defined is an aggregate. But in order for this statement to be even more evident, let us see it in the following example: ‘man is man.’ Here, ‘man’ in the subject is an entity, and ‘man’ in the predicate is a being and not an entity. Hence, just as ‘man’ in the predicate is the same as man in the subject, so too the definition is the same as the thing defined.

SMet 7.13.Q2

[3210-3215] But this can be called into question in the following way. If ‘man’ in the subject indicates an entity [and] in the predicate a being, and a being is not an entity, then the ‘man’ that is made a subject and the one that is predicated are not the same thing. And if this is true, then it is not possible to find in common terms any proposition where the same thing is predicated of itself, but it will only be possible to find this in singular terms, and there is no true predication there.

[3216-3220] What then does Boethius intend to say when he says: “Nothing is truer than a [proposition in which the same is predicated of itself]”\(^{35}\)? For it seems that he says

\(^{34}\) Averroes, *In Metaph.* 7.40 (ed. Iunt. 1552, 8: 90v; ed. Iunt. 1562, 8: 192va): “And [Aristotle] said ‘in some way’ since the definition is one with the thing defined according to predication, not because the definition itself (which is the form) is the thing defined itself (which is what has form).”

something false if what was said before is true; for the predication ‘man is man’ is truer than ‘Socrates is Socrates’ according to Aristotle.

[3221-3224] To this we must reply that when we say ‘man is man’, here the same thing according to predication is predicated of itself, and [it is] not the same as an entity in act is the same as an entity in act. In the same way a definition is the same as the thing defined.

[3225-3228] In reply to the first question [13.Q1] we should say that what is defined is the aggregate of common matter, adequate to the form of the thing defined, and the form itself—I mean, not signate matter in its ultimate designation.

[3229-3236] But about the claim that the form is what is defined, we must know that every aggregate that does not consist of matter in act and form, but rather of common matter in potency and common form, is called form. And from this the difference between the matter of the species and the matter of the individual is evident, [namely] that the matter of the species, or that which is defined, is the common matter adequate to the form of the species and is not signate in the ultimate designation. But the matter of the individual is not common matter, but signate in the ultimate designation.

[3237-3243] And suppose someone were to say that, since matter is common, it follows that matter itself is the universal and what is predicated. We should reply that the prime matter of all things is common, and nonetheless its commonness is not commonness of predication, for it is not predicated. But if we do not speak about the prime matter of all things, but about the one composed of the prime matter of all things and of forms, such matter can be predicated—for example, body, flesh, and animal.

[3244-3262] In reply to another point [13.Q1, Metaph. 1036a28-29] we must speak in two ways. In one way, the two names ‘whole’ and ‘form’ can be understood as different. For by ‘whole’ we can understand the common matter adequate to the whole species and the form of that species. Hence, according to this explanation, the statement “definition is of the whole and of the form” has truth in this way: definition pertains to the form primarily and to the whole secondarily, because in virtue of the form (quia per formam). For just as the aggregate is not named except through form, so too a definition does not belong to it except through form. Although definition pertains to the whole secondarily, nonetheless definition pertains to it as that which bears the definition and is the subject of definition. But definition pertains to the form as that whose parts are actually explained through a defining statement. And this is what he says: “The parts of the definition are only the parts of the form”36; for the parts of the aggregate are not actually explained by a defining statement. And I say this on account of matter, since, although it is not actually explained, nonetheless it is understood in some manner in a defining statement. Hence, the parts of the whole aggregate are signified in the definition, although a certain part is actually signified and not another.

[3263-3272] That matter in some way is signified in the defining statement is evident, for by the name of the genus we understand matter. Hence the Commentator says that by the name of the genus matter is signified, insofar as it is in potency the thing that has it, and in this way it is predicated of the thing that has it. But the name of matter, such as ‘flesh’ and anything of this sort, signifies matter as that which is in act and as some part of that of which it is the matter (aliquid eius cuius est materia). And in this way [matter] is not predicated of the thing that has it except with a preposition, for an entity in act is not predicated of an entity in act. Hence, man is neither flesh nor bone, but composed from flesh and bones.

[3273-3282] Therefore, let us understand a brief summary of this solution as follows. We can understand the parts of a definition in two ways: [a)] either as those that are actually explained by the definition, and of such parts of a definition it is not true that the parts of the definition and those of the thing are the same, for in this sense the formal parts of the thing and not its matter enter the definition; or [b)] not only as those that are actually explained, but as those which in some way are understood through something actually included in the definition, and in this sense the parts of the definition and those of the thing are the same, because in this sense matter is said to be part of the definition.

[3283-3285] From what has been said it is now evident that the things that are primarily parts of a definition are only the parts of the form; but those that are secondarily signified are parts of the aggregate and not of the form alone.

[3286-3294] And from this is evident, in turn, that the whole nature and quiddity of the thing defined, which is the aggregate, is indicated by the definition, because all the parts of the thing defined are understood by its definition, although some actually and some not. And it is also evident that matter is signified through the name of the genus. Hence, [matter] is the part in potential of the definition and not actually explained by the defining statement. And that matter is signified through the name of the genus is evident, for if matter were not signified through the name of the genus, the genus would not be predicated in quid but in quale.

[3295-3309] From these things it is manifestly evident how the proposition “the parts of the definition are only the parts of the form” should be understood, and similarly this one: “what is defined is the form”. From these things it is also manifestly evident how the Commentator does not contradict himself or Aristotle when he says that “the parts of the thing defined are in some way parts of the definitions,” and thus he seems to suggest that matter is part of the definition. And soon after he says that “the parts that are [parts] as matter are not in the definition”; for by this, as it seems, he wants to suggest that

37 Metaph. 1037a18: “The parts that are in the expression are in some way parts of the definitions.” // “partes quae sunt in sermone sunt quoquomodo partes definitionum” (Arabica-Latina) // “ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρισµῶν πάς μὲρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ” (ed. Ross). Cf. Averroes, In Metaph. 7.40: “The parts of the substance are in some way the parts of the definitions” // “partes substantiae quoquomodo sunt partes definitionum” (ed. Iunt. 1562, 8: 192va).

38 Metaph. 1037a24-25: “the parts that are like matter are not in the definition of substance” // “partes quae sunt sicut materia non sunt in definitione substantiae” // “ἐν μὲν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὰ ὁταν μόρια ὡς ὑλὴ οὐκ ἔνεσται” (ed. Jaeger).
matter is not part of the definition. But this contrariety is solved by means of what has already been said. But that the definition pertains to the aggregate is evident from what the Commentator writes about some paragraph in the first book of the *Metaphysics*: “The form is not defined but the aggregate of matter and form”;39 for the species that is defined is composed of common matter—adequate in scope to the whole species—and of form.40

**SMet 7.15**

[3765] Then, let us now speak about etc.41

[3766-3776] A new chapter begins here, in which the fourth distinction of this seventh book is found, and in which the author intends to give the explanation for the unity of definition and of the thing defined, since nowhere in the logical books he explained it. And in this chapter the seventh conclusion of the seventh book is found, and it is that the defined species of a substance is truly one and also its definition. This chapter occupies the whole present lecture, and it is found as a whole in this lecture. This chapter is divided into two parts. [1] In the first of them [Aristotle] sets up the question and slightly discusses it; [2] in the second, which begins with the words “But it is necessary”42 etc., he offers a solution to the question.

[3777-3785] And notice that the greatest part of this solution comes from the knowledge of the nature of proper division. [1] The first part is divided into two parts: [1a] in the first he asks the question; [1b] in the second, which begins with the words “Because in man”43 etc., he shows in what sense the aggregate of some parts is not one but many. And this second part is divided in two parts. [1bi] In the first of them he shows this; [1bii] in the second he shows that the differentia is not in the genus as an accident in a subject—this second part begins with the words “But this one”44 etc.

[3786-3798] [2] The second part of the lecture is divided into two parts. [2a] In the first of them he shows what things and of what sort come into a definition, and what is the affinity of the genus to the differentia, and what is the unity and what is the difference of these to one another. [2b] In the second, which begins with the words “But it is necessary to divide”45 etc., he shows the nature of proper division, rectifies it, and teaches [how] to avoid the mistakes that take place in it. [2a] The first part is divided into two parts: [2ai] in the first he shows what things and of what sort enter the definition; [2aii] in the second, which begins with the words “Either the genus will not be”46 etc., he shows the affinity of

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39 Averroes, *In Metaph.* 1.9 (ed. Iunt. 1562, 8: 10ra-rb).
the genus and the differentia. [2b] The part in which he shows the nature of proper division is divided into two parts: [2bi] in the first he explains the nature of proper division; [2bii] in the second part, which begins with the words “Although it is not necessary” etc., he teaches [how] to avoid the mistakes that occur in relation to true division.

SMet 7.15.N1

[3799-3803] And notice what the Commentator says here. For he raises this question: since the logician and the philosopher consider this question, what is the difference between their two ways of considering, and indeed why does the logician not settle this question, which is about the unity of definition?48

[3804-3815] In reply to the first [question] he answered in this way: the logician considers definition insofar as it is an instrument that leads the intellect to understand the quiddity of a thing—i.e. he considers definition as it is predicated quidditatively (in eo quod quid) of that of which it is a definition, and only insofar as it is a predicate. But the philosopher considers definition insofar as it signifies the true natures of things, and not only insofar as it is predicated. For this reason the logician considers definition only insofar as it is a principle of knowledge, but the philosopher insofar as it is a principle of knowledge and of being. And therefore the solution to this question belongs to the philosopher and not to the logician, and for that reason it is settled here and not in the Analytics.

SMet 7.15.E1

[3816-3822] In particular he proceeds in this way, saying we must raise a subtle question about the definition of substance, and that is why the definition of a substance is truly one. For example, let us suppose that this is the true definition of man: ‘two-footed animal’. If it is the definition of man, something truly one is made from these things. What is the cause of this? And, in turn, why is it that ‘animal and two-footed’ is not said to be the definition of man, but this is not the case with ‘two-footed animal’?

[3823-3832] Subsequently, he says that this is not so in the aggregate of substance and accident, as if I said ‘pale man’. For this expression is one accidentally. This is not the case when I say ‘two-footed animal’, for surely this expression is truly one, and ‘two-footed’ is not an accident with respect to ‘animal’. And he proves this in the following way: If ‘two-footed’ were in ‘animal’ as an accident is in a subject, then the differentia

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48 Averroes, In Metaph. 7.42: “To consider definitions is common to the logician and the philosopher, but in two different ways. For the logician considers definitions insofar as they are an instrument which induces the intellect to understand the quiddities of things. But the philosopher considers them as what signifies the natures of things. And for this reason, to give the causes of this is more proper to the latter’s science.”
opposite to it would similarly be in ‘animal’ as an accident is in a subject. But an accident
is in a subject in actuality, and therefore these differentiae would be in ‘animal’ as
contraries in actuality. Therefore, contrary things would be in the same [subject] in
actuality. Hence, the differentiae are not in a genus as an accident is in a subject.

[3833-3842] And if someone were to say that from the genus and the differentia there is
one thing and one definition, since the genus and the differentia are in one [subject], we
can argue against this in the following way: if this were the reason, then all things would
be one, because they are in one thing—for example, in the world; or alternatively it
would follow that the ten categories are one, because they are in a single [subject], which
is false. That the definition is one is evident. But the defined substance is truly one, and
he indicated this position by writing “For they are not”\(^{49}\) etc., and “Therefore it must be”\(^{50}\), etc. Hence, what is intended in these parts are the two incidentals he posits.

[3843-3847] But the Commentator explains the cause of this problem in the following
way: The definition of a substance is truly one, since the last differentia given in the
definition contains the form through which the thing defined is truly one entity in act; but
through the other parts included in the definition and preceding the last differentia, the
thing defined is nothing other than an entity in potency.\(^{51}\)

\(S\)\textit{Met 7.15.E2.1}\n
[3848-3852] Subsequently he says that the genus and [vel] the differentia or [vel]
differentiae enter the definition of a substance, which is found by means of proper
division. And, as he says, it does not matter whether one or more differentiae are included
in the definition, for either way is possible.

[3853-3861] Subsequently he says that the genus is not in all ways different from the
proper differentia that divides it. For, in act, the genus is not different from the
differentia, as they are considered in the same thing, but in potency the genus is different.
For this reason the genus and the differentia are many in potency, one in act, and
therefore the species is truly one. But according as the genus and the differentia are
many, and this by considering the genus potentially, the genus is potentially to the
opposite differentia. But according as they are one and considered in one thing, the genus
is not potentially to the opposite differentia.

\(^{50}\) \textit{Metaph.} 1037b23-4: “\textit{Ergo debet esse}” (\textit{Arabica-Latina}) // “ὥστε ἑνός τινος δεῖ αὐτὸν εἶναι λόγον” (ed.
Ross).
\(^{51}\) Averroes, \textit{In Metaph.} 7.42: “The last differentia given in definitions is the differentia which contains the
form through which the entity is one in act, and is an entity in act. For the differentiae that are before the
last differentia are present in the thing defined in potency, and therefore the thing defined is not multiplied
through the multiplication of the parts of the definition.”
SMet 7.15.N2

[3862-3867] And notice that the person who states the last differentia that constitutes the definition names the whole of what is in act in the thing defined, and also in some way that which is in potential. For the genus is understood potentially in the name of the differentia just as what is prior [is understood] in what is subsequent. But the person who states what is subsequent (quod consequenter est), states the whole in act, not the whole in potential except as a consequence (ex consequenti).

[3868-3876] And notice that the last differentia, which is a quality of the genus and the whole quiddity of the species, is predicatable of the species quidditatively (in eo quod quid). For this reason, if someone asks ‘what is a man?’ we would rightly answer ‘rational’. But to someone asking what sort of man, we would not rightly answer ‘rational’ but ‘pale’ or ‘dark’. And Aristotle agrees with this in the seventh book of the Topics, saying that genera and differentiae are predicatable of the thing quidditatively.

From these things it is manifest that the differentia indicates the whole in act, not the whole in potential.

SMet 7.15.E2.2

[3877-3885] In the same part the author also says that the genus and the differentia are one in act, and one thing is designed to be made from these, just as from ultimate matter and form—I say one in act and two in potency, and it is not far from this that the genus and the differentia are the same. And he indicates this in the case of the letter, for he says that sound is the matter of letters and also their genus, since it is predicatable of particular words; it is the matter because in sound, as in matter, different letters are generated by different kinds of percussions.

[3886-3896] Subsequently he says that the nature of proper division must be considered in this way. First, the first genus should be taken and divided by means of proximate differentiae essential to it, and which do not add new and foreign natures to the nature of the thing divided, but that are rather of one nature with the nature of the thing divided. And then one of the two differentiae should be taken and divided in this way. You should proceed in accordance with this method until you reach the species you intended. And if this is the true nature of proper division, it follows necessarily that each and every single

52 Metaph. 1038a6-8: “Since sound is genus and matter, but the differentiae make the forms and the letters from sound” // “quoniam sonus est genus et materia. Differentiae vero faciunt formas et litteras a sono” (Arabica-Latina) // “Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ γένος καὶ ὄλη, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ ταύτης ποιοῦσιν” (ed. Ross).
dividing element will be less than the thing divided. Therefore, the dividing elements and
the thing divided will be coextensive (non erunt excedentia et excessa).

[3897-3913] Then in the same part he says that if you proceed in this way, defining by
division, and observe the conditions of division in this way, it follows necessarily that the
last differentia included in the definition will be convertible with the thing defined and
will state the whole substance of the thing defined. For example, let two-footed be the
proper differentia of animal, and let animal be divided by means of this differentia (‘two-
footed’) and the differentia opposite to it. Subsequently take two-footed and divide it by
means of differentiae such that they do not add different natures to the nature of two-
footed. Therefore, two-footed will not be divided by means of winged and not-winged,
for wing indicates a nature different from foot and it is not referred to it. It is therefore
necessary for two-footed to be divided in this way: one two-footed [kind] has cloven feet,
the other does not have cloven feet. For clovenness and non-clovenness are dispositions
by means of which different operations of the feet of different animals can be completed.
Therefore, if someone proceeds by means of this kind of division, he will find the
aggregate he intended, since he will find the differentia that is the whole nature of this
aggregate and convertible with it.

[3914-3921] Subsequently he says that if someone did not want to proceed by means of
this kind of division, he will make many mistakes when trying to define some thing, as
saying something superfluous in the definition and other things, and everyone should
beware of this. For if he observes the correct rules of the dividing element, he will not
repeat any differentia [already] included in the definition, for this is to err by saying
something superfluous. For example, if someone defines man as follows: “man is a two-
footed animal, of whom ‘two’ [and] ‘foot’ are predicated”, he makes a mistake in
defining, since the same thing is signified by ‘two-footed’ and ‘two’ [and] ‘foot’.

[3922-3932] Next, if he does not proceed in accordance with the method of proper
division, he will sometimes divide the genus by means of differentiae that are not
essential but accidental, and thus he will make a mistake in definition, since when things
are so defined infinity is reached, and infinity does not grant demonstrative knowledge.53
And also, if someone in defining does not proceed in accordance with the nature of
proper division when dividing the genus into differentiae, he may put something
superfluous in the definition and be a nugator.54 And a nugator mistakes the order in
substance, since about definable things we must suppose that one is prior and another
posterior. But a nugator says the same thing twice and says that something else is
posterior to itself, and therefore he mistakes the order in substance.

53 Averroes, In Metaph. 7.43: “And if someone divides a differentia by means of an accidental division (for
example, two-footed into pale and dark and such accidental differentiae), and these accidental ones into
accidental ones, then these differentiae will be infinite, and what is infinite does not grant demonstrative
knowledge”.
54 ‘To be a nugator’ is the translation of the verb nugari, cognate with the noun nugatio (‘nugation’). In
modern scholarship it is a common practice to translate nugatio as ‘babbling’ and nugari as ‘to babble’.
Let us inquire into Aristotle’s statement that the last differentia included in the definition is convertible with the thing defined.

It seems that this can be proven in the following way:

Suppose that a genus has only two primary differentiae that jointly divide it, and that every differentia added to the genus produces a species. Let \( A \), then, be the genus; \( B \) and \( C \) the primary differentiae that jointly divide \( A \). Let \( D \) be the species constituted from \( A \) and \( B \), and \( E \) the species constituted from \( A \) and \( C \). \( A \) and \( (B \text{ or } C) \) are converted because \( A \) is divided into \( B \) and \( C \) by means of true and proper division. Likewise, \( A \) and \( (D \text{ or } E) \) are converted, and therefore \( (B \text{ or } C) \) and \( (D \text{ or } E) \) are converted. But \( B \) is the proper differentia of \( D \), and \( C \) is the proper differentia of \( E \). Therefore, \( C \) is in no way related to \( D \), nor \( B \) to \( E \). Therefore, if the two propositions are converted, \( B \) must be converted with \( D \), and \( C \) with \( E \). Therefore, the proper definition will be convertible with the proper thing defined.

On the contrary:

The second book of the *Posterior Analytics* says that the definition as a whole is equal to the thing defined, and any part [of the definition] is less. Therefore, the final differentia will not be equal to the thing defined, since it is a part of the definition. In reply to this we must say that the final form can be signified in two ways: in one way, it is signified by one name, and then it is convertible with the thing defined, as Aristotle understands it here. In another way, it can be signified through its parts, and since its parts are less, it is in this way that this form is said to be less.

Alternatively, we must say that Aristotle said what he said in *Posterior Analytics* II because it was widely believed (famosum) at that time. For everyone used to suppose that the parts of the definition were less than the thing defined, and this because they did not know the answer to the question about the unity of definition, namely, in what way the definition is one. But in this science [Aristotle] speaks truthfully and not according to what had been widely believed, speaking *per intentionem* about definition and its unity. And for this reason he said here that the last differentia is convertible with the thing defined, for otherwise the definition would not be one. Therefore, in solving this problem he tells the truth about the unity of definition, i.e. that the last differentia included in the definition is convertible with the thing defined and indicates its whole quiddity.