Subsequently he says that the cause of their error was that they did not suppose that what is first in potential and then in act is one and the same thing, but that it is one thing and another. But now this is not the case; on the contrary, ultimate matter and form are one and the same, and therefore the thing defined is one and the definition is one, and they do not have any other cause except the mover that leads matter into form. Hence, what is first in potential and then in act is one and the same thing.

But about this proposition, “ultimate matter and form are one and the same,” there is a great uncertainty, which will be explained afterwards.

Notice, however, that in the case of all generated substances, whose forms are all produced in being through generation, the aforementioned proposition has manifest truth. Hence, in the case of these things the author solved well the aforementioned problem. But in the case of other things, in which the form comes from something external, the aforementioned proposition is questionable, which will be made clear later.


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† Perhaps nunc here means ‘as a matter of fact’, as sometimes Aristotle’s vův.